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Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of workmen's compensation law is the question whether a third party in an
action by the employee can recover over against the employer, when
the employer's fault has caused or contributed to the injury.
The typical fact situation is that presented in American District
Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson.1 Kittleson was an employee of Armour
and Company. American District Telegraph Company had contracted with Armour to repair a signal system. One of American's
employees fell through a skylight and landed on Kittleson, injuring
him severely. Kittleson accepted workmen's compensation from Armour and also sued American, as he was entitled to do under the
Iowa Act. The negligence alleged was that of American's employee
in failing to ascertain whether the skylight would carry his weight.
American brought a third-party complaint against Armour, asserting
that the injury was primarily due to Armour's negligence in allowing
the skylight to become so encrusted with dirt that it was indistinguishable from the roof around it. Armour moved to dismiss
the third-party complaint on the ground that Armour's compensation
liability was exclusive. It is interesting to note that the compensa* Professor of Law, Duke University. Member, Wisconsin Bar. Undersecretary
of Labor, 1954-56; Director, U.S.I.A., 1956-57; Special Assistant and Special Consultant to the President, 1957-61; Consultant to the President on International
Affairs, 1965-69; Consultant to the State Department on International Organizations, 1963-69; Director, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University. Author:
THE LAw oF WOREMEN'S COMPENSATION (4 volumes with annual supplement),
1953; CASES ON CORPORATIONS (with R.S. Stevens), 1947; PROPAGANDA (with J.B.
Whitton), 1963; KNOW YoUR SOCIAL SECURITY, (2nd ed.), 1959; WHEN NATIONS
DISAGREE, 1961; SOVEREIGNTY wvrrHN THE LAw (with C.W. Jenks), 1965. A.B.
Augustana College, 1931; B.A., 1935; M.A., 1938; D.C.L. Oxford University, 1957.
1 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950), rev'g 81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
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tion liability amounted to $6,800, while the judgment recovered
against American was almost $60,000.
The district court dismissed the third-party complaint. The
court of appeals reversed and held that Armour could be held liable
to American for the damages that American had to pay Armour's
employee.
Each side to this controversy has an argument in its favor
which, considered alone, sounds irresistible. The employer complains with considerable cogency that the net result is that $60,000
has been put in the employee's pocket and has left the employer's
pocket, all because of a compensable injury-in spite of the plain
statement in the workmen's compensation act that the employer's
liability for such an injury shall be limited to compensation payments.
Yet, if the third party were made to bear the entire $60,000
damages, he would argue with equal cogency that it is unfair to subject him, the lesser of two wrongdoers, to a staggering liability which
he would not have had to bear but for the sheer chance that the other
parties involved happened to be under a compensation act. Why
should he, a stranger to the compensation system, subsidize that system by assuming liabilities that he could normally shift to, or share
with, the employer?
The law on this subject is of recent and rapid development. A
high proportion of the law has been made in the federal courts, and
of this law a very high proportion has grown out of the triangular
relation between (1) an injured longshoreman, (2) a shipowner
sued by the longshoreman for unseaworthiness of the vessel on which
the work was performed, and (3) the longshoreman's employer, a
stevedoring company, to whom the shipowner attempts to transfer
the burden of his own liability on some theory of indemnity or contribution based on the stevedoring company's fault. It is evidence
of the closeness of the question that at one time there were four
different rules standing side by side, produced by the four courts of
appeals that had been confronted with the issue.' The Supreme
Court then took a hand in the matter s and put to rest some of the un2 Baceile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 282
(1952); Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951); United States v.
Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950); American DisL Tel.
Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950), rev'g 81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Iowa
1948).
8 See discussion of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S.
124 (1956), in text accompanying notes 56 et seq. infra.
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certainties and conflicts existing in the lower courts; nevertheless, in
many respects the law is still in a formative stage.4
The cases dealt with in this article can best be considered by
identifying three possible situations:
A. The third party seeks a tort-type of recovery over
against the employer (contribution).
B. The third party seeks a contract-type recovery over
against the employer; the source of the employer's relation to the
third party is contractual.
C. The third party seeks a contract-type recovery over
against the employer; the relation between the third party and the
employer is not contractual in origin.
In commencing the main analysis of the recovery-over problem,
we may first note that there is broad agreement that a distinction
must be observed between recovery over in the form of contribution
and recovery over in the form of indemnity. The right of contribution is based either upon contribution-between-tortfeasor statutes or
upon common law or admiralty contribution, where available and
applicable. The right of indemnity is based upon an independent
duty or obligation owed by the employer to the third party, either as
the result of express contract or as the result of an implication raised
by law.
CONTRIBUTION
The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer
whose concurring negligence contributed to the employee's injury
cannot be sued or joined by the third party as a joint tortfeasor,
whether under contribution statutes or at common law.; The ra4 This is particularly true of the interesting implications of Federal Marine
Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969). This case held that
the employer's rights against a third party whose negligence caused the injury for
which the employer had been required to pay workmen's compensation are not
necessarily confined to his statutory rights of subrogation to or reimbursement from
the employee's cause of action. The decision opens up interesting new possibilities
for suits by the employer-stevedore against the third-party shipowner-rather than
the other way round, which has been the usual pattern-and raises a number of
yet-to-be answered questions about the interplay between this kind of suit and the
shipowner-versus-stevedoring-company suit that will develop when everyone, including the longshoreman, finally asserts his rights to the hilt against everyone else.
See detailed discussion at 2 A. LARsON, THE LAw op WoRxmmq's Comi'NsATioN
§ 77 (Supp. 1969).
5 Federal: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Murray v. United
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tionale is a simple one: the employer is not jointly liable' to the
States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (applying the Federal Employees' Compensation Act); General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th
Cir. 1968) (applying Louisiana law); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.
1967); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., 377 F.2d 511
(5th Cir. 1967); Bertone v. Turco Prods., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958); Hill
Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955); Peak
Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1954);
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); White v.
McKenzie Elec. Coop., Inc., 225 F. Supp. 940 (D.N.D. 1964); Christie v. Powder
Power Tool Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C. 1954) (where United States has paid
benefits, it cannot be held liable for contribution or indemnity); Ward v. Denver &
R.G.W.R. Co., 119 F. Supp. 112 (D. Colo. 1954); Coates v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1951); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vallendingham,
94 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1950); Lo Bue v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y.
1950), affd, 188 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1951); Frusteri v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 667
(E.D.N.Y. 1947); Calvino v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y
1939). Florida: Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275
F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (applying Florida law).
Georgia: O'Steen v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 294 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (applying Georgia
law); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 165 S.E.2d 587 (1968);
Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 68 S.E.2d 384 (1951).
Louisiana: General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.
1968); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. J. Ray McDermott Co., 347 F.2d 371 (5th
Cir. 1965); Gifford v. Aurand Mfg. Co., 207 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 1968); McLaughlin v. Braswell, 207 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 1968); Gros v. Steen Prod. Serv.,
Inc., 197 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 1967); Sanderson v. Binnings Constr. Co., 172 So. 2d
721 (La. App. 1965). Maryland: Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works,
Inc. v. Rukert Terminals Corp., 193 Md. 20, 65 A.2d 304 (1949) (applying Longshoremen's Act and ruling out not only contribution but also indemnity, unless
assumed by express contract); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39
A.2d 858 (1944). Michigan: Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 376 Mich. 41,
135 N.W.2d 370 (1965). New Jersey: Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority,
31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (1954). North Carolina: Hunsucker v. High
Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953) (Workmen's
Compensation Act abrogates both the statutory right of a negligent third party to
claim contribution from a negligent employer and the common law right of a
passively negligent third party to demand indemnity from an actively negligent employer); Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950); Hoover
v. Globe Indem. Co., 202 N.C. 655, 163 S.E. 758 (1932); Brown v. Southern Ry.,
202 N.C. 256, 162 S.E. 613 (1932). Ohio: Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Hardware & Forging Co., 77 Ohio App. 121, 62 N.E.2d 180, appeal dismissed,
145 Ohio St. 615, 62 N.E.2d 251 (1945). Rhode Island: Rowe v. John C. Motter
Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363 (D.R.I. 1967); contra, Newport Air Park, Inc.
v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I. 1968) (both applying Rhode Island law).
Texas: cf. Westfall v. Lorenzo Gin Co., 287 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
There can be no contribution or indemnity unless there be gross negligence by the
employer. Wisconsin: A.O. Smith Corp. v. Associated Sales & Bag Co., 16 Wis.
2d 145, 113 N.W.2d 562 (1962); Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Dean, 275 Wis.

236, 81 N.W.2d 486 (1957); Verhelst Const. Co. v. Galles, 204 Wis. 96, 235 N.W.
556 (1931).
6 The accent here is on "liable."
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employee in tort; therefore he cannot be a joint tortfeasor.7 The
liability that rests upon the employer is an absolute liability irrespective of negligence, and this is the only kind of liability that can
devolve upon him whether he is negligent or not. The claim of the
employee against the employer is solely for statutory benefits; his
claim against the third person is for damages. The two are different
in kind and cannot result in a common liability.
Except for a few holdings to the contrary in federal district
courts," this view went unchallenged until the appearance of the
Third Circuit's opinion in Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, in 1951. Although the case itself was reversed by the Supreme Court, the views
expressed in the court of appeals' decision are sufficiently stimulating
in themselves to deserve careful attention-particularly since this was
a sincere attempt to work out a sort of compromise to minimize the
apparent unfairness of an all-or-nothing disposition of the recoveryover problem. The court points out at once that the tort liability
here is in admiralty, a system that has developed rules according to
its own sense of right, including its distinctive "moiety rule" applicable to mutual wrongdoers. The requirement of common liability
is not, therefore, quite so sacred in an admiralty setting as it might
be at common law. The court then states the heart of its position
and its answer to the conventional reasoning summarized above:
While Haenn [the employer] was responsible to Baccile [the employee] regardless of its fault, Haenn's negligence in fact brought
to fruition his right to compensation. In a pragmatic sense,
therefore, Haenn and Halcyon [the third party] were, to use the
preferable admiralty law description, "mutual wrongdoers."' 0
The court goes on to observe that a contrary rule would permit
the employee, at his election, to cast the entire burden of loss upon
one of two wrongdoers, the employer going completely free since
he has even been relieved of his compensation obligation by the employee's election. It is interesting to reflect that the employer is thus
bution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act define joint tortfeasors as persons jointly or
severally "liable in tort."
7 Sanderson v. Binnings Constr. Co., 172 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 1965); Farren v.
New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (1954).
8 See, e.g., The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); Rederii v.
Jarka Corp., 26 F. Supp. 304 (D. Me. 1939). See also The Tampico, 45 F.
Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942), and Portel v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y.
1949), both of which lost their importance as -the result of the later contrary decision in American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950).
9 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
10 Id. at 405.
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in a better position if both he and a third person are negligent than
if no one was negligent.
It is next stressed that the policy of compensation acts is not to
relieve the employer of all liability, but rather to limit his liability
to the amounts specified in the act. Hence the court, pragmatic to
the last, concludes that although it will allow the third party a recovery of contribution from the employer, it will limit the amount
to that sum which the employer would have been liable to pay the
employee in compensation. The court thus partly avoids the dilemma posed by the two irreconcilable positions described at the
outset; at least the third party is not left to bear the entire burden
alone.
The actual basis of the Supreme Court's reversal of this case did
not reach this issue, but rather involved a narrow point of admiralty
law. The Supreme Court ruled that the admiralty doctrine under
which mutual wrongdoers share the damages equally does not extend to noncollision cases such as this one. At the same time, by
way of dictum, the Court cast a cloud over the arbitrary selection of
the amount of compensation liability as the amount of contribution
liability when it observed that, even if there were a fresh legislative
solution of the problem of contribution in noncollision cases,
there would still be much doubt as to whether application of the
rule or the amount of contribution should be limited by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, or should
be based on an equal division of damages, or should be relatively
apportioned in accordance with the degree of fault of the
parties. 1
Sooner or later a case had to come along that involved a collision, and thus make it impossible for the Court to avoid deciding
the conflict between the admiralty moiety rule and the compensation
exclusive-liability defense. The case, Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co.
v. United States,' 2 reached the Supreme Court in 1963. A United
States ship and a Weyerhaeuser vessel collided at sea and both were
found to have been at fault. Ostrom, a seaman on the United States
ship, received $329.01 in benefits under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act. In a third-party negligence suit against the
11 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,
286-87 (1952).

342 U.S. 282,

12 372 U.S. 597 (1963), rev'g United States v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 294
F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1961). This case will be referred to in text as Weyerhaeuser I
to distinguish it from Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S.
563 (1958), which will be referred to as Weyerhaeuser 11.
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steamship company, he agreed to a $16,000 settlement. Then, in
an action brought under the admiralty moiety rule against the
United States, the steamship company included the $16,000 settlement in its list of costs. The United States resisted the item on the
ground that if it were included the United States would be indirectly
liable for one-half of the settlement under the moiety rule, even
though the Federal Employees' Compensation Act states that the
liability of the United States for injuries to its employees is limited
to the Act and that the Act is "exclusive and in place of all other
and anyone
to the employee.
liability of the United States .
otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States on account of such injury . . . . ,3 The Ninth Circuit recognized that
either the admiralty rule requiring division of damages when both
vessels are at fault, or the exclusive remedy rule in the F.E.C.A.,
must give way to the other. The court felt that that which could not
be done directly should not be done indirectly, that sovereign immunity existed unless waived, and that the exclusive-remedy provision prevailed. The United States was found not liable for one-half
the amount paid to the federal employee by the steamship company
as a result of the collision.
The Supreme Court reversed, in a decision whose precise holding and implications require the most careful analysis to avoid reading more into the case than is really there. So important is this
precaution that the heart of the opinion is set out here in full:
In Ryan v. Pan-Atlantic Corporation,350 U.S. 124, it was held

that despite this exclusive liability provision, a shipowner was entitled to reimbursement from a longshoreman's employer for
damages recovered against the shipowner by the longshoreman
injured by the employer's negligence. The Court's decision in
Ryan was based upon the existence of a contractual relationship
between the shipowner and the employer. ...
In the present case there was no contractual relationship
between the United States and the petitioner, governing their correlative rights and duties. There is involved here, instead, a rule
of admiralty law which, for more than 100 years, has governed
with at least equal clarity the correlative rights and duties of two
shipowners whose vessels have been involved in a collision in

which both were at fault. The Schooner Catharinev. Dickinson,

17 How. 170, 177; The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 21. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corporation, 342 U.S. 284. Long
ago this court held that the full scope of the divided damages
rule must prevail over a statutory provision which, like the one
13 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964).
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involved in the present case, limited the liability of one of the
shipowners with respect to an element of damages incurred by
the other in a mutual fault collision. The Chattahoochee, 173
U.S. 540 ...
In this case, as in The Chattahoochee, we hold that the
scope of the divided damages rule in mutual fault collisions is unaffected by a statute enacted to limit14 the liability of one of the
shipowners to unrelated third parties.
A careful reading of this passage indicates that the case cannot
be relied on as authority for more than the proposition that the
moiety rule in admiralty takes precedence over the exclusive-liability
defense under a compensation act. Cases involving the moiety rule
are, in effect, excluded from the branch of contribution cases and,
instead, assimilated into the Ryan type of independent-indemnityduty cases. The key factor here is that the moiety obligation, unlike
contribution between tortfeasors generally, is indeed a separate duty
based, not on the two wrongdoers' mutual relation to the plaintiff,
but on their relation to each other. This point was crisply brought
out in the first leading case to interpret the scope of Weyerhaeuser L
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 5 as a result of a collision between a military plane and a United Air Lines plane, compensation
was paid by the United States for the deaths of the government
employees aboard the airline's plane under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act. In a third-party suit against United by representatives of the deceased employees, United sought recovery over
against the United States. This was resisted on the ground that the
exclusive-remedy clause of the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act, which is indistinguishable from that of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act, barred recovery over. The court held the recovery over barred, both on the theory of indemnity (which will be
returned to later) 16 and- on the theory of contribution, as to which
Weyerhaeuser I had been heavily relied on by the airline. In distinguishing it, the court said:
The admiralty rule of divided damages is to be distinguished
from the rule of indemnity urged upon us by United since under
admiralty law there arises from a collision involving mutual fault
the right to apportionment of all damages resulting therefrom,
including personal injuries, cargo damage, and damage to ships.
The divided damage rule is based upon the duty which each
shipowner owes the other to navigate safely irrespective of any
14 372 U.S. at 602-04.
15 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),-cert:denied,379 U.S. 951 (1964).
16 See text accompanying note 55 et seq. infra.
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duty to the person injured. On the other hand neither contribution nor indemnity may be awarded without the support of liability on the part of the indemnitor to the person injured. The
courts have consistently held that in the absence of an express
or implied contract of indemnity, or in the absence of the indemnitor's liability
to the injured party, there can be no recovery for
7
indemnity.1

The key words in this quotation are the italicized words: "irrespective of any duty to the person injured." This, it will be readily
seen, is the exact opposite of the phrase in the compensation act
which must be satisfied: "liability . . . on account of such injury

(to the employee)."
The United States Supreme Court at this writing has not ex-

plicitly passed on the accuracy of this interpretation of the scope of
its opinion in Weyerhaeuser I, but it has had ample opportunity to
disavow it, if it had chosen to. In the United Air Lines case, certiorari was dismissed."8 Later the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its

position on essentially similar facts in Wien Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
United States.19 Indeed, the cases were so similar that the airline
did not even attempt to distinguish the United Airlines case, but
20
sought certiorari, which was denied.
335 F.2d at 403 (emphasis added).
379 U.S. 951 (1964).
19 375 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967).
20 Nevertheless, some uncertainty and disagreement persisted as to where the
law stood after Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963)
(Weyerhaeuser 1), rev'g United States v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 294 F.2d 179
(9th Cir. 1961). One reason was the history of the Treadwell litigation. The Third
Circuit in Drake v. Treadwell Constr. Co., 299 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1962), had held
that the exclusive-remedy clause of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act precluded a claim for contribution over against the United States by a joint tortfeasor
against whom a government employee had successfully brought a third-party suit.
The Supreme Court, within a month after handing down Weyerhaeuser I, remanded
Treadwell for further consideration in the light of that case. Treadwell Constr.
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 772 (1963). On remand, the district court allowed
contribution. The government at first appealed, but later moved for dismissal of
the appeal "for the reason that the Solicitor General of the United States has
recommended against appeal." By order of the court dated September 23, 1963,
the appeal was dismissed. C.A. 14517, W.D. Pa., Gourley J. Note that this case
arose under Pennsylvania law, with its unique results in this area. See note 22
infra.
Then came Hart v. Simons, 223 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1963). This was a suit
by an employee of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration against a
manufacturer of a machine through whose defects she alleged she was injured. The
manufacturer filed a third-party complaint against the United States. The plaintiff (not the United States) moved to dismiss the United States. The court traced the
Treadwell history, followed. the Supreme Court's instruction to look at Weyerhaeuser
17
18
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One may round out this series of cases with the one that is perhaps the most remarkable of all, Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United
States.21 The facts were quite similar to those in the United Airlines
case: a government employee was killed in an air collision, and the
widow, having accepted compensation, sued the third-party owner
of the other aircraft, who in turn sued the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act as joint tortfeasor. The law of Rhode Island applied, and was found to have no controlling precedent on the
exact issue. The court then deliberately adopted the minority
"Pennsylvania contribution rule," on the theory that this is what
Rhode Island would do if the question were presented, and permitted
a claim for contribution.
To understand why the court felt it necessary to adopt the
Pennsylvania rule, one must bear in mind that there are two barricades by which the typical exclusive-remedy clause might ward off
an action by the third party against the employer. The more familiar one is the barring of suits against the employer by the employee or his dependents on account of the injury; the destruction of
this liability to the employee means in turn that there can be no
joint liability of the employer with the third party for tort leading to
that injury. In the vast majority of cases, this is as far as a court
needs to look. If for some special reason this formula does not apply,22 however, there is a second hurdle that must be cleared if conI and, having done so, concluded that a contribution claim against the United States
was permissible. The government, however, did not abandon its position that the
claim was barred, and in the ultimate settlement between Hart and Simons, it was
stipulated that the complaint against the government should be dismissed. Civil
No. 27953 (E.D. Pa., stipulation of dismissal filed November 2, 1964).
21 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I. 1968).
22 The formula did not apply in Pennsylvania because of the peculiar "Pennsylvania rule" on contribution. This rule, unique to Pennsylvania except as Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I. 1968), can be taken
as importing it to Rhode Island, is that contribution between joint tortfeasors
under the Uniform Act depends not on joint liability but on joint negligence. To
put the matter a little more exactly, one may quote Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "Implicit in these holdings is the view that the definition of
'joint tortfeasors' does not require that they have a common liability toward the
injured party but only that their combined conduct be the cause of the injury."
Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 102 n.2, 216 A.2d 318, 320 n.2
(1966). It will be readily observed that this rule is in conflict with that described
earlier as the normal rule, based as it is on the fact that the Uniform Act actually uses the term "jointly liable in tort." See note 6 supra. See also Sanderson
v. Binnings Constr. Co., 172 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 1965); Farren v. New Jersey
Turnpike Authority, 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (1954). Judge Pettine in
the Newport Air Park opinion regretfully recognized that another district judge,
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tribution is to be allowed against the employer.

The typical ex-

clusiveness statute also says that the employer's compensation liabil-

ity on account of the injury shall be exclusive, not only as to the employee, his dependents, and perhaps other listed persons, but also
as to "any other person." On the strength of this catchall clause,
the employer may argue that the third person is directly barred, even
in situations or jurisdictions that would not bar him in his capacity
as one whose incapacity to recover over is derivative from the em-

ployee's incapacity to sue his own employer.
It is as to this second hurdle that language in Weyerhaeuser I
has been pressed into service. The court in Newport Air Parkrecog-

nized that Weyerhaeuser I was of no help on the joint tortfeasor approach, being limited to the impact of the distinctive maritime rule
of divided damages. It did, however, quote this passage from WeyerhaeuserI:
[A]s between the Government on the one hand and its employees
and their representatives or dependents on the other, the statutory remedy was to be exclusive. There is no evidence whatever

that Congress was concerned with the rights of unrelated third
23
parties ....
A similar expression by the United States Supreme Court may
be found in Ryan, when it said that the obvious purpose of the ex-

clusive remedy provision
is to make the statutory liability of an employer to contribute to
its employee's compensation the exclusive liability of such employer to its employees, or to anyone claiming under or through
Judge Day, in the same district, applying Rhode Island law, had ruled out contribution against the employer on similar facts, on the ground that an employer could
not be a joint tortfeasor under the Uniform Act, because not jointly liable. Rowe
v. John C. Motter Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363 (D.R.I. 1967).
Once the requirement of joint liability is removed, the employer's defense based
on absence of liability to the employee collapses. Pennsylvania has accordingly
produced a series of cases allowing the third-party action over against the employer
in contribution-but it has also arbitrarily limited the amount of contribution to the
amount of the employer's compensation liability. Kim v. Michigan Ladder Co.,
208 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Winters v. Herdt, 400 Pa. 452, 162 A.2d 392
(1960); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959); Socha v. Metz, 385
Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837 (1956); Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940);
Stark v. Posh Constr. Co., 192 Pa. Super. 409, 162 A.2d 9 (1960). But, as just
indicated, this is only half the battle. There remains the argument that the third
party comes within the term "any other person" barred from suing the employer
"on account of such injury." It is this argument that is of general interest and is
discussed in the text.
23 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 601 (1963) (Weyerhaeuser 1) (as quoted in 293 F. Supp. at 812).
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such employee, on account of his injury or death arising out of
that employment. In return, the employee, and those claiming
under or through him, are given a substantial quid pro quo in

the form of an assured compensation,
regardless of fault, as a
24
substitute for their excluded claims.
There are two serious flaws in this quotation, which were not
necessary to the Ryan decision, and therefore could probably be considered dicta. The first flaw is the gratuitous insertion of the words
"claiming under or through such employee." These words do not
appear in the statute and, although they did no harm in Ryan, they

could greatly complicate the exact issue now under discussion.

The

test provided by the statute is clear and adequate, and it lies in the

words "on account of such injury."

This provided all that was

needed in the actual Ryan decision to sidestep the exclusive-remedy

bar, since the stevedore's liability was on account of his contract.
The second flaw is the equation of barred plaintiffs with persons
getting a quid pro quo in the form of compensation. The statute

imposes no such limitation, and it is quite common for various relatives and dependents to have their common-law rights barred al-

though they get nothing in return in the form of compensation bene-

fits.25

Judge Pettine, in Newport Air Park, having decided to accept
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129 (1956).
2 A. LARSON,THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 66 (Supp. 1969). The
court in Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I. 1968),
also invoked the doctrine of ejusdem generis to support a conclusion that "any
other person" meant only any other person such as other relatives not named.
The court conceded that some courts had decided differently, citing Rhoades v.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Cal. 1962), and Christie v. Powder Power
Tool Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C. 1954). It bolstered this with an appeal
to legislative history, observing that there was nothing in the legislative history of
the exclusiveness clause to indicate that it was for the benefit of third parties.
This may be true, but two comments are in order: (1) an examination of
legislative history is appropriate only when a statute is ambiguous, which this one is
not; and (2) while legislative history does not reveal an intent that third parties
should be embraced within the words "any other persons," neither does it reveal an intent that they should not. With matters in this posture, a sweeping
catchall phrase like "any other person" should not be judicially cut down, especially
when the Congress further indicated its desire to achieve maximum inclusiveness
by adding the word "otherwise," making the total phrase "any other person
otherwise entitled to recover damages." The court candidly admits that its construction "does not seem to account for the use of the term 'otherwise' in the statute," but sticks to the construction anyway. Here again it must be stressed that
the act itself supplies an adequate limitation on these words. The relevance of
the barred action to the compensation act is fully assured by requiring that the
barred action be "on account of such injury."
24
25
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contribution against the employer in principle, then went on to accept
also the Pennsylvania limitation on the employer's contribution liability to the amount he would be liable for in compensation. The
rationale for this limitation is unabashedly pragmatic. He said:
No doubt, if open-ended contribution over against employer was
permitted, the social and economic policies underlying the compensation scheme would be subverted. Indeed, such limitless
contribution would probably compel a complete reconsideration
of the actuarial basis of compensation insurance.2 6 In so far as
the plaintiff here seeks such an open-ended recovery, it must be
denied.1 7 However, the Pennsylvania rule which permits their
compensation liability has much to commend it: (1) it preserves the economics of the compensation system; (2) it effectuates the policy of contribution which.the passage of the uniform law suggests; (3) it harmonizes the compensation law
with the law of contribution and (4) it protects the non-employer tortfeasor from the possible gross inequity of carrying the
whole liability for wrongs caused in perhaps major part by the
employer tortfeasor.28
It must be acknowledged that this is an impressive list of advantages of the end result achieved. Indeed, if a court were free
to start with a clean slate, leaving aside for the moment the problem
of reconciling the result with legal theory and statutory language,
and were able to postulate an optimum result and work back from
it, the rule in Newport Air Park would probably be the fairest available compromise in the light of all the conflicting policy interests.
At least it can be said of this division that the employer pays no more
than he is obliged to pay under compensation law, as he might if
some fuller contribution were allowed, but also that he pays no less,
as he might if no recovery over were allowed.
How to get from here to there legally is another matter. The
At this point the opinion contains the following footnote:
As the court stated in Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 216
A.2d 318, 319 and n.3 (1966):
Absent such a limitation on contribution, the employer could complain
with considerable cogency that he has been compelled to contribute to a recovery by the employee beyond the amount the latter would be entitled to
under workmen's compensation. Thus, he would be exposed to a potentially
larger liability in those circumstances in which a third-party tortfeasor was
involved than where his own negligence was the sole cause of the injury.
The limited liability feature of workmen's compensation would be subverted
under such circumstance. See 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law
§ 76.10 (1961 ed.).
293 F.2d at 815 n.15.
27 The court's footnote here states: "After a thorough search of the law, this
court can find no case which goes so far." Id. at 815 n.16.
28 293 F. Supp. at 815 [numbers of court's footnotes changed to conform to
footnote numbers in this article].
26
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Pennsylvania route involves not one tour de force but two. First,
to get contribution at all, the statutory language "liable in tort"
must be held to mean not "liable," but guilty of having contributed
to a tort. Second, to keep the amount of contribution from being
open-ended, it must be limited to the employer's compensation liability; and, since there is really no strictly legal rationale requiring
this, the limitation must be arbitrarily imposed for reasons of policy.
It is interesting to recall that this result is exactly what the Third
Circuit set out to produce and did produce in the Baccile case. 29 It
got past the no-contribution problem by applying the admiralty
moiety rule and, like Judge Pettine, surmounted the limitation problem by the simple expedient of decreeing the limitation for practical
and policy reasons. The Supreme Court, as we have seen, reversed
on the first point80 and cast doubt on the second, saying that even
if there were a legislative treatment of the problem, there would still
be a question whether the amount of contribution should be the
amount of compensation, or half, or an amount proportioned to degree of fault.31 Weyerhaeuser I made it clear that the right of moiety
contribution was still available against the employer in collision cases.
Since Congress in the meantime has not responded to the Supreme
Court's invitation to investigate the total tangle of interests and come
up with a legislative decision on how the loss should be shared, there
remains one special area, that of collision cases under admiralty law,
where the employer can be liable for a sort of "contribution" going
beyond his compensation liability-if it should happen that that liability is less than half the damages recovered by the employee against
the third party.
If it is postulated that the compromise result achieved in Pennsylvania, in Rhode Island by Newport Air Park, and temporarily in
the Third Circuit by Baccile is desirable, there is a short cut that puts
all the parties in this same position with less waste of motion. This
is the rule adopted in North Carolina 2 and California 3 under
which, when the employer's negligence contributed to the injury, the
29

Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 342 U.S. 282

(1952).
30 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
31 See quotation in text accompanying note 11 supra.
32 Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d
768 (1953). In North Carolina the reduction applies when there is an actively
negligent employer.
33 Tate v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr.
548 (1963).
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employee's third-party recovery is merely reduced by the amount of
compensation. Suppose the third-party verdict is $10,000 and the

compensation outlay is $3,000.

Under the Pennsylvania contribu-

tion rule, the employer would pay the employee $3,000, the third
party would pay the employee $10,000, the employee would pay
back the $3,000 to his own employer, and the third party would
recover $3,000 from the employer as contribution. At the end of
the process, the employee would have $10,000, the employer would
have parted with $3,000, and the third party would have paid

$7,000.

Under the North Carolina rule, the employee would

merely keep his $3,000 and then collect $7,000 from the third person.

84

The determination and ingenuity displayed in Baccile, Murray,35 Weyerhaeuser I, and the Pennsylvania, North Carolina and
34 This is a judge-made rule, based heavily on the general idea that no one
should profit by his own wrong. In California, the decision was based also on
approval of the results in both North Carolina and Pennsylvania precedents. Witt
v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). It is significant
that the opinion lumps together the North Carolina and Pennsylvania doctrines,
as is in effect done here, in spite of the different mechanisms involved in reaching
a comparable end product. Moreover, since the California decision involved overruling earlier precedents, the court cited the intervening legislative abrogation of
the noncontribution rule as a ground for the new holding. CAL. CODE CIV. P.
§§ 875-80 (West 1969 Supp.). One reason that had been given for the older rule,
denying any reduction of the third party's liability to the employee when the
employer was negligent, was that the third party at that time could not have recovered contribution from the employer in any case. Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, Ltd., 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d 313 (1938). Of course,
quite apart from the availability or nonavailability of contribution, the earlier rule
could also have been arrived at on the familiar legal theory that the cause of action
is the employee's in any event, and, therefore, his full recovery should not be affected by his employer's negligence. 2 LARsoN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 75.21-.22 (1969). However, the intervention of the contribution amendment did give California a legal handle with which to steer its rule in what it was
convinced was a more equitable direction.
35 Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968). A quite different
legal path to a somewhat different compromise solution was adumbrated in this
opinion in a passage which is something more than a dictum and something less
than the ratio decidendi of this case. The plaintiff employee was injured in the
fall of an elevator and received compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. He then sued the building owner, Murray, who had leased the
building to the United States. Murray counterclaimed against the United States
both for contribution and for indemnity under the provisions of the lease. Summary judgments dismissing both counts were affirmed. As to contribution, the
issue of interest to the present discussion, Judge Leventhal emphatically concluded
that it was ruled out by the exclusive-remedy principle, since contribution is only
possible "when the tortfeasors have a concurring liability to the same victim."
Judge Leventhal traced the story of the impact of Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United
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California cases, are strong evidence of a conviction that some device
ought to be found to arrive at a compromise of the interests of employer and third party in this class of cases. The disadvantage of
most dispositions of this total problem is one that is characteristic
of the common-law system: the inability to share a loss adjustment
because of the legal imperative of granting total victory to plaintiff or
defendant. Thus, the usual rule that contribution by the negligent
employer is impossible because conceptually he cannot be a joint
tortfeasor, or that his negligence is not a defense in a third-party action, is too absolute a victory for the employer, who actually comes
out ahead by being reimbursed for his compensation outlay. Then,
States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963) (Weyerhaeuser 1), along the lines of the discussion in
this article, including the initial confusion about its scope, and concluded that subsequent cases, notably United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), and Wien Alas. Airlines, Inc. v.
United States, 375 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967), were
persuasive in limiting the contribution aspects of Weyerhaeuser I to the peculiar
admiralty contribution rule there involved, based as it is on a duty between the
shipowners as distinguished from a mutual duty to the plaintiff. At this point, however, without any warning that a really sensational legal innovation was about to be
unveiled, Judge Leventhal said:
Any inequity residing in the denial of contribution against the employer is
mitigated if not eliminated by our rule in Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S. App.
D.C. 129, 300 F.2d 721 (1962). Martello holds that where one joint tortfeasor
causing injury compromises the claim, the other tortfeasor, though unable to
obtain contribution because the settling tortfeasor had "bought his peace," is
nonetheless protected by having his tort judgment reduced by one-half, on the
theory that one-half of the claim was sold by the victim when he executed the
settlement. In our situation if the building owner is held liable the damages
payable should be limited to one-half of the amount of damages sustained by
the plaintiff, assuming the facts would have entitled the owner to contribution
from the employer if the statute had not interposed a bar. A tortfeasor
jointly responsible with an employer is not compelled to pay the total common law damages. The common law recovery of the injured employee is thus
reduced in consequence of the employee's compensation act, but that act gave
him assurance of compensation even in the absence of fault.
405 F.2d at 1365-66. The legal basis for this reduction is criticized in detail in
2 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.22 (Supp. 1969).

On the practical and policy side, the prime defect of the Murray result is that
there is no rational relation between the 50% reduction in plaintiff's recovery and
the interests of either the employee or the employer. Consider, for example, the
facts of American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950), rev'g
81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Iowa 1948), with which this article opened. The compensation liability there was $6,800 and the third-party recovery was $60,000. If this
situation were to arise under Murray, the plaintiff, instead of recovering $60,000
and rembursing the employer for $6,800, thus retaining $53,200, would recover
only $30,000 from the third party, plus his $6,800 compensation, for a total of
$36,800-in spite of the fact that at the trial he must be assumed to have established actual damages of $60,000. By what logic can he be told that he should absorb a loss of $16,400 for the benefit of the third-party tortfeasor? A rule capable of producing such a result is unacceptable, particularly since its legal underpinnings are as unsound as its practical result.
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by perhaps unavoidably over-reacting to this inequity, the courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have resorted to the concept of indemnity, which will be discussed in the remainder of this
article. If the indemnity remedy succeeds, however, again we witness an all-or-nothing solution, this time with the employer paying

the whole bill, despite his supposed limitation of liability under the
compensation act. Finally, as if to restore the balance somewhat
in the opposite direction, we see the United States Supreme Court
in the Burnside case8 6 opening up a field of litigation by the employer over against the third party, entirely independent of the employer's subrogation rights under the act. Here, of course, the employer's damages would be limited to his compensation liability and
consequently, in the limited area in which a Burnside type of claim
is possible, we may witness yet one more avenue by which to reach
the compromise solution arrived at in Baccile, and in the Pennsylvania, North Carolina and California cases.
What is needed is legislative study followed by a statutory arrangement carefully tailored to deal fairly with all the competing
interests and policies at stake. Although the Supreme Court issued
just such a call to Congress in 1952,87 neither Congress nor any
state legislature has touched the problem. Meanwhile a luxuriant
jungle growth of court decisions, struggling with the controversy, has
sprung up and the rate of growth shows no signs of abating. Even
more lively than the developments concerned with contribution have
been those swirling around the concept of indemnity to which we
now turn.
INDEMNITY AS EXCEPTION TO EXCLUSIVE-REMEDY CLAUSE

The third party may recover over against the employer whenever it can be said that the employer breached an independent duty
toward the third party and thus acquired an obligation to indemnify
the third party.
The initial question is whether the exclusive-remedy clause is
broad enough to grant immunity to the employer for all causes of
action growing out of the accident, regardless of the question of independent breach of duty. This issue requires careful examination
of the language used in the particular exclusive-liability provision.
36 Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
See note 4 supra.
37 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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The statutory language directly relevant in most of these cases
is a familiar passage similar or identical to that in the Longshoremen's Act, the New York Act, and many of the other acts applied
in these cases:
The liability of an employer prescribed by the last preceding section shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability
whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on ac38
count of such injury or death ....
At first glance, this language seems broad enough to cover almost any claim against the employer relating to the injury. It has
been taken by several judges to be broad enough to embrace any
recovery over against the employer by the third party, on the theory
that it must have been intended to limit the employer's overall liability to exactly the same degree that it limited the employee's rights
against the employer. 9
A closer reading of the passage, however, makes this interpretation questionable, and the majority of courts have preferred a narrower construction. They reason as follows: the immunity con3s

N.Y.

WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney

1965)

(emphasis added);

Longshoremen's Act § 5, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964). The latter is substantially the
same as the quoted provision, except that it specifically names the "wife" and, in
place of "at common law or otherwise," has "at law or in admiralty."
39 See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278
N.Y. 175, "180, 15 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1938) (Crane, C.J., dissenting) and district
court opinions in American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Iowa
1948), rev'd, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950), and Rich V.United States, 81 F. Supp.
587 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), rev'd, 177 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Royal Indem.
Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960). The
court held that the statutory language "[any employer . . . shall not be subject
to any other liability whatsoever

. . .

and all causes of action . . . accruing to any

and all persons whomsoever are hereby abolished," N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-10-5, 6
(1953), barred a suit against the employer based upon an implied agreement to
indemnify a third party. The court did not extend its decision to include an
express agreement to indemnify, nor would the court recognize a distinction between
indemnity and contribution of jont tortfeasors.
In American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584,
187 A.2d 864 (1963), an employee of a subcontractor was injured and brought suit
against the property owner, who sought indemnity from the general contractor on
the theory of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956), for alleged breach of contract to perform the work in a careful and workmanlike manner. The right of a third party to such indemnity had been specifically
rejected by the court of appeals of Maryland as not permissible under the employers'
exclusive-liability provision of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act. The
immunity was applied in American Radiator to the general contractor as a statutory
employer. See also Engel v. Bindel, 27 Wis. 2d 456, 134 N.W.2d 404 (1965).
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ferred is only against actions for damages on account of the employee's injury; a third party's action for indemnity is not exactly
for "damages" but for reimbursement, and it is not "on account of"
the employee's injury, but on account of breach of an independent
duty owed by the employer to the third party.4 0°
Express Contract of Indemnity
The clearest exception to the exclusive-liability clause is the

third party's right to enforce an express contract in which the employer agrees to indemnify the third party 4' for the very kind of loss
that the third party has been made to pay to the employee. 42 A
40

See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).

41 Federal: Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd in part

and rev'd in part and remanded sub nom., American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello,
330 U.S. 446 (1947); Lowe v. California Co., 296 F. Supp. 1264 (E.D. La. 1969).
Idaho: Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 91 Idaho 151, 417 P.2d 417 (1966).
New Jersey: Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. 379, 92 A.2d 873 (1952). In
Yearicks, defendant could join the employer as third party on the basis of an express contract of indemnification, although he could not be joined as a joint tortfeasor. Plaintiff recovered compensation for employee's death and then sued the
city in tort. The court held that the city could join the employer as defendant on
the basis of his contract to save the city harmless from any loss resulting from his
negligence. See also Hardman v. Ford Motor Co., 70 N.J. Super. 275, 175 A.2d 455
(1961). New York: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 302 N.Y. 545, 99 N.E.2d
882 (1951); Mirsky v. Seaich Realty Co., 256 App. Div. 658, 11 N.Y.S.2d 191
(1939); General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Union News Co., 23 Misc. 2d
956, 200 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1960); Clements v. Rockefeller, 189 Misc. 889, 70 N.Y.S.2d
146 (1947). North Carolina: Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 265 N.C. 459,
144 S.E.2d 393 (1965); Watkins v. Murrow, 253 N.C. 652, 118 S.E.2d 5 (1961).
Ohio: Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667
(1967). Virginia: Western Contracting Corp. v. Power Eng'r Co., 369 F.2d 933
(4th Cir. 1966). Wisconsin: Huck v. Chicago, S.P.M. & 0. Ry., 14 Wis. 2d 445,
111 N.W.2d 434 (1961); Umnus v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 260 Wis. 433,
51 N.W.2d 42 (1952).
42 The third-party tortfeasor cannot, of course, defend on the ground that the
employee's employer has contracted to indemnify defendant, and will thus have to
pay both workmen's compensation and tort damages. If the employer wants to
make that kind of contract, that is his affair; the employee's rights cannot be affected by such an agreement. Unus v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 260 Wis. 433,
51 N.W.2d 42 (1952). Moreover, having made this kind of agreement, the employer cannot then undo its effect and pass the burden back to the employee by
piling yet another agreement on this relationship-an agreement by the employee
that he will not exercise his rights against the third party for liabilities that the
employer has indemnified. Since the statute itself casts ultimate liability on the
third party, a contractual provision in the employment contract that in this situation the employee's exclusive remedy shall be workmen's compensation is void, and
an attempt to enforce such a provision through an injunction against further
prosecution at law by the employee of his rights against the third-party indemnitee
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familiar example is the situation in which an employee is injured because of the condition of the premises, and recovers from the landlord who leased the premises to the employer. If the landlord in the
lease has exacted a covenant from the employer to hold the landlord harmless in the event of such claims, the enforcement of this
covenant does not violate the exclusive-remedy provision of the compensation act.4 3 Another increasingly familiar example is the holdharmless agreement assumed by a contractor doing work for a city44
or other owner, 45 or by a subcontractor for the benefit of the general
contractor.48 Indeed, with everyone trying to protect himself by such
agreements, one may even encounter them in series, along which
the liability travels until it settles upon the ultimate indemnitor. In
Hardman v. Ford Motor Co.,47 a subcontractor's employee was inwas struck down by the court of appeals of New York. Western Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 302 N.Y. 545, 99 N.E.2d 882 (1951).
Note that, under well-established principles of indemnity, a general agreement to
indemnify will not be construed to include indemnifying the indemnitee against the
consequences of his own negligence; to achieve this result there must be a clear and
explicit agreement. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Elmore, 189 So. 2d 522 (Fla.
App. 1966). See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co.,
275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (citing and following Elmore). In the former
case an express contract of indemnification was relied upon by the third party in
an attempt to recover over against the employer; this failed because it did not explicitly indemnify against the indemnitee's own negligence. In the latter case, the
third party relied on an implied agreement to indemnify. The court pointed out,
however, that for the third party to have become liable to the employee in the
first place, he must have been guilty of some negligence, unlike the shipowner held
to the absolute liability for unseaworthiness. Although the third party here contended his negligence was only passive, the court held that no implied indemnity
could arise. If even under an express contract of indemnity the indemnitee's own
negligence (in any degree) is not included, a fortiori an implied agreement of indemnity could rise no higher. On the general rule that indemnity does not cover
the indemnitee's own negligence unless explicit, see United States v. Seckinger,
408 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1969), and cases there cited. For earlier cases see 175
A.L.R. § 17, at 29 (1948). For examples of express contracts that actually covered
the indemnitee's own negligence, see Cozzi v. Owens Corning Fiber Glass Corp., 59
N.J. Super. 570, 158 A.2d 231, aff'd, 63 N.J. Super. 117, 164 A.2d 69 (1960); Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667 (1967).
43 Clements v. Rockefeller, 189 Misc. 889, 70 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1947).
The landlord is, of course, liable to the employee even though, as between the landlord and
tenant employer, the landlord has by express contract absolved himself of liability
for the condition of the premises. Kaylor v. Magll, 181 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1950).
44 See, e.g., Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. 379, 92 A.2d 873 (1952).
45 E.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667
(1967).
46 E.g., Western Contracting Corp. v. Power Eng'r Co., 369 F.2d 933 (4th Cir.
1966).
47 70 NJ. Super. 275, 175 A.2d 455 (1961).

370

Workmen's Compensation: Third Party Actions

jured when the ladder on which he was standing slipped on a highly
waxed floor. The contractor had furnished the ladder and was
found to be negligent in not securing the ladder. The building
owner was found to be negligent in not warning the employee of the
highly polished surface. The subcontractor's employee successfully
sued the contractor and the building owner. The owner crossclaimed against the general contractor on an indemnification agreement. The general contractor similarly filed a third-party complaint
against the subcontractor for indemnification. The end result was
that the injured employee's employer was held responsible for the
judgment.
Separate Duty Based on Relationship
If the third party and employer stand in a special legal relationship that carries with it the obligation of the employer to indemnify the third party, this relational right of indemnity may be
enforced without offending the exclusive-remedy clause.
Such a relationship is that of a bailee to his bailor. In a leading
California case, Baugh v. Rogers,48 the employer, driving a car belonging to the third party, ran into his own employee. The employee sued the third party as owner of the car, under an owner's
liability statute. The third party then claimed the right of reimbursement from the employer, whose negligence was the actual cause
of the injury. It was held that the bailee of an automobile had a
separate obligation to hold the bailor harmless from damage arising
out of the bailment, and that this obligation extended to indemnification for imposition of third-party liability on the owner in the present
circumstances.
This type of case usually presents, in addition to the special
legal relations flowing from the concept of bailment, an extreme contrast between genuine negligence in one party and the most technical
and constructive sort of imputed negligence in the other. This contrast, rather than the specific implications of bailment, was stressed
in a somewhat similar Minnesota case, Lunderberg v. Bierman.49
Mrs. Bierman had taken her newly-purchased automobile back to
48 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944).
See also Bowman v. Atlanta Baggage
& Cab Co., 176 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Fla. 1959), holding a car rental agency entitled to indemnity from an employer-lessee. The court added that the compensation payments made by the employer should be deemed pro tanto satisfaction of
the indemnity obligation.
49 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
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the dealer for a 2,000 mile check-up provided for by the contract of
purchase. As part of the check-up, lstrup and Elder Lunderberg,
two employees of the dealer, took the car out for a road test, during
which Elder Lunderberg was injured as a result of Ilstrup's operation
of the car. Elder collected workmen's compensation, and then sued
Ilstrup as the driver, and Mrs. Bierman as the owner with whose
permission the car was being operated, under the Minnesota statute
imposing such liability on motor vehicle owners.5" Mrs. Bierman
was allowed to implead the dealer and was granted a summary
judgment against him on the ground that he was liable to indemnify
Mrs. Bierman for any recovery by Elder Lunderberg against her.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed. The court relied not
only on Baugh, but on several cases in which there was similarly a
disparity between the relatively minor or technical fault of the third
party and the active or primary negligence of the employer. 5 ' The
ground of the decision, then, is not the narrow one of the specific
obligation of a bailee to hold a bailor harmless, but is the broader
principle stated as follows by the court:
[The impleaded defendant is liable]. . . where, as here the parties are not in pan delicto, but, instead, the injury arises out of a
violation of a duty which one owes to the other so that as between
themselves the act or omission of one is the primary cause of the
injury and liability exists
as to the other only by virtue of a law
52

imposing such liability.

New Jersey has reached a conclusion similar to that in the bailment cases when the special relation was that of principal to agent,
entailing the implied obligation of the principal to indemnify the
agent for losses or liabilities attending the carrying out of the
agency.53 The deceased employee's widow had brought a wrongful
death action alleging negligence against one of her husband's coworkers. The co-worker impleaded the employer as a third-party
defendant on the ground that the employer would be liable to indemnify him for torts committed at the direction of the employer.
The dismissal of the third-party suit was reversed. Although there
could be no contribution between joint tortfeasors, indemnification
50 MINN. STAT. ANN. §
51

170.54 (1960).
American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); Burris

v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); Westchester Lighting Co. v.
Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
52 241 Minn. at 363, 63 N.W.2d at 364 (citing Fidelity & Gas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140 Minn. 229, 167 N.W. 800 (1918).
53 Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Super. 580, 166 A.2d 784 (1960).
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would be allowed on the ground of an implied promise of indemnity
by the principal for damages resulting to the agent from the execution of the agency. The court is careful to point out that if this
were a simple case of negligence on the part of the agent, indemnity
would not apply. But if the agent in good faith performs a tortious
act at his principal's direction, or if he commits a tortious act relying
on his principal's representations as to its legal propriety, he is entitled to indemnity from the principal. 54 Although in this case the
pleadings were based on alleged negligence, the court felt that, for
purposes of a motion to dismiss, the state of the factual record was
not such as to exclude the possibility of a right of indemnity based
on the separate duty of the principal to indemnify his agent for
losses incurred in the execution of the agency.
SeparateImplied Obligation to Use Care
When the employer's relation to the third party is that of a contractor doing work for the third party, there may be an implied obligation to perform the work with due care. If, by failing to use such
care, the employer causes an accident injuring his own employee, it
may be said that the employer has simultaneously breached two duties of care. One is toward the employee, and it is for this breach
that compensation bars any common law remedy. The other is toward the third party contractee, and among the damages flowing
from the breach of this separate duty are any damages the third party
may be forced to pay the employee because of their relation. In
the leading New York case, Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester
County Small Estates Corp.,65 the third party, as owner of the premises on which the injury occurred, became liable to an employee of
the light company for his asphyxiation resulting from a gas leak.
The third party, as occupier of the land, had failed in his duty to discover the dangerous condition and warn the employee who was
working upon the premises. The employee's own employer, however, had by his active negligence caused the break in the gas line
and had thus failed in his duty toward the third party to perform
the work with due care. It was accordingly held that the third party
was entitled to indemnity from the employer, and that this liability
was independent of the liabilities barred by the exclusive-remedy
clause.
54 See 2 REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439, at 329 (1958).

55 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938) (Crane, C.J., dissenting-
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Since 1955, this doctrine has been associated with and strongly
influenced by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.56 The Ryan
case holds that when the contract merely called for the performance
of specified stevedoring operations, this, by analogy to the manufacturer's implied warranty of soundness of a manufactured product,
implied an obligation in fact, as a part of the contract, to perform
the service in a workmanlike manner. From this the court goes on
to the next step and finds a further implied agreement to indemnify
the shipowner for damages sustained as a result of the nonperformance of the implied duty to perform the work safely.
If this sequence of implied agreement superimposed upon implied agreement is accepted, the legal justification of the right of action over against the employer is clear enough. The exclusive-remedy clause is circumvented because the liability of the employer is not
"on account of' the injury to the workman as required by the typical
exclusive-remedy clause, but rather "on account of' the employer's
contract with the third party, as elaborated by the implied obligation
to use care and to indemnify.
The Ryan case set off a Niagara of litigation, mostly but not
entirely involving longshoremen. The discussion of it here will be in
two parts. The first will be concerned with the body of law directly
controlled by Ryan and related cases, as being within the federal
orbit. The second will consider Ryan as it fits in with or affects the
law under nonfederal acts, where although it has no binding force,
it nevertheless looms very large in any discussion, both because of
the prestige of the Supreme Court and because of the sheer mass
of the decisional jurisprudence it has fathered.
FederalLaw Under the Ryan Doctrine
The first major point established by Ryan is the decisive difference between recovery over between parties whose relation rests ultimately on contract and recovery over between parties whose basic
relation is noncontractual in origin. This distinction was felt to be
indispensable both to avoid the exclusive-remedy provision of the
Longshoremen's Act and, in the process, to distinguish Halcyon,
56 350 U.S. 124 (1956). This case was first affirmed by an equally divided
court. 349 U.S. 901 (1955). It was reargued before a full court and affirmed by
a 5-to-4 vote, with Mr. Justice Black writing the dissenting opinion, in which Chief
Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clark concurred
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which had ruled out contribution in noncollision cases. 57 The distinction has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court" and

followed by federal courts59 and, although it has not escaped criticism,60 appears to be about as firmly entrenched as any rule of law
can be.

It must be stressed again that the contract-tort distinction in
this connection goes to the root of the parties' relation to each other,
and not to the theory of the remedy sought. We have already dealt

with the category in which the origin of the relation is noncontractual
(e.g., a collision) and the form of the remedy is noncontractual
(contribution between joint tortfeasors). Later in this article, we
will examine the category in which the origin of the relation is noncon-

tractual but the remedy is described in contractual terms (e.g., indemnity). Ryan clearly cannot be extended to this category. So far
as the Ryan line of decisions is concerned, there is no such creature

as "noncontractual indemnity."
The Ryan category is contractual at both levels: there is some
kind of contract in the background from which the rights and duties

of the parties are ultimately derived and the remedy is cast in contract-type terms, typically indemnity.
Without, then, going into the pros and cons"1 of Ryan, one may
57 See text accompanying notes 5 et seq. supra.
58 Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404
(1969); Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315 (1964); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421
(1960); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958) (Weyerhaeuser 11).
59 See, e.g., Feliciano v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 411 F.2d 976
(1st Cir. 1969); Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Ocean
Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967); Wien Alas. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 375
F.2d 736 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967); United Air Lines v. Weiner,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); General
Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).
60 Proudfoot, "The .Tar Baby": Martime Personal-Injury Actions, 20 STAN. L.
REv.423 (1968), believes most of the complications and inequities following in the
train of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956),
could be avoided by handling the whole category of liability under tort principles.
61 The dissent in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124
(1956), contains a cogent presentation of the arguments against the holding. One of
them lost its force not long after the decision. The Longshoremen's Act at the
time required the employee to elect between compensation and a third-party suit.
The dissent argued that the employee could afford to bring a third-party suit only
if the employer advanced money to him and helped him in expectation of being
reimbursed. After Ryan, the argument ran, no employer in his right mind would
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observe that, both conceptually and legally, the majority's opinion is
defensible. If one begins with the proposition, which no one appears to question, that a recovery over against an employer, based
on an express written contract specifically agreeing to indemnify the
third person is not a recovery "on account of the injury," all that
remains is to say that an implied agreement of indemnity is equivalent
to an express one, and that in the circumstances such an agreement
should be implied.
As for the propriety of making everything depend on whether
the relation between the parties stems from a contract, there is a
factor here that, in the welter of controversy about Ryan, has been
largely overlooked. Early in its opinion, the Court drops this interesting footnote:
In the instant case, the stevedoring contractor, however,
has received a contractual quid pro quo from the shipowner for
assuming responsibility for the proper performance of all of the
latter's stevedoring requirements, including the discharge of foreseeable damages resulting from the contractor's improper performance of those requirements."2
Another largely forgotten fact was mentioned in passing in the
dissent: the shipowner had agreed in writing to pay "in some circumstances, cost of the stevedore's insurance."0 3
The significance of these passages is that they remind us that,
in a contract situation, the parties are in a position to adjust in advance the distribution of losses between them. Specifically, one may
assume that, with the Ryan doctrine firmly established, its impact
has been reflected in increased liability insurance premiums of stevedoring companies. These increases, in turn, presumably go into the
cost accounts of the stevedore firms and become part of the price
of the service charged to the shipowners. Since all stevedores are
under the same rule of law, there is no reason why competition
should prevent the working-out of the passage of this cost back to
the shipowner. By contrast, two strangers who meet for the first
time in a random collision have no such opportunity to work things
out in advance by agreement between the two of them.
help finance a suit destined to backfire as Ryan did. The amendment of the Longshoremen's Act abolishing election and permitting the employee to claim compensation and also to sue the third party rendered this argument obsolete, as events
have shown. The flood of longshoremen's third-party suits is a far cry from
Justice Black's dictum that the Ryan decision "makes the right of employees to
recover damages from a third party a barren promise." Id. at 144.
62 Id. at 129 n.3.
63 Id. at 136.
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When it is said that the Ryan rule only applies to contract-based
cases, this does not mean that there necessarily has to be privity of
contract. In WeyerhaeuserI the Supreme Court said:
The Court's decision in Ryan was based upon the existence of a
contractual relation between the shipowner and the employer.
In a series of subsequent cases, the same result was reached,
although the contractual relationship was considerably more
attenuated. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Co., 355 U.S.
563; Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423; Waterman Co.
v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421.64
The attenuation in Crumady was the result of the fact that the stevedore's contract was actually with a charterer, not with the vessel
owner. The Court indicated alternative grounds for applying Ryan
and not insisting on direct privity of contract between the stevedore
and shipowner. One theory was that the ship, so to speak, was the
third party beneficiary of the contract, since the contract to perform
a workmanlike job was for the benefit of the vessel. The plaintiff
longshoreman's action, it should be mentioned, was in rem against
the ship. The other theory harked back to the analogy in the Ryan
opinion between a contract to perform workmanlike service and a
manufacturer's warranty of soundness of goods.
Under the analysis here suggested, a third practical argument
is available. Whether the relation between the parties is a direct
contract or a chain of contracts, they still have it within their power
to adjust their loss-sharing relations in advance in order to accommodate them to applicable rules of law-a decisive difference from a tort
encounter.
In Waterman the stevedore's contract was with a consignee of
cargo, and the plaintiff's action was in personam against the shipowner. The Court merely referred back to its double-barreled rationale in Crumady in holding that lack of privity was no obstacle
to application of Ryan. It is obvious, however, that the third party
beneficiary theory is less satisfactory as to a consignee, 5 and that
64 372 U.S. at 602-03. See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967). Applying Florida law, the court
accepted the Supreme Court rule that privity was not essential for liability as in
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan. Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The court
held, however, that Ryan should be limited to indemnitees who had been liable
without fault, which was not true here, and granted summary dismissal of the action over by Florida Power & Light Company against Hercules.
65 358 U.S. 423 (1959). Indeed, one federal court of appeals decision would
limit the third-party beneficiary argument in Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959), to the situations arising under the peculiar admiralty
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the other two arguments are more versatile in covering this type of

situation.
rule of a vessel's liability in rem. In Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302
F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1962), an employee of Norton Drilling Company was injured
through the negligence of Halliburton, an oil well servicing concern. Both had
contracts with the oil well owner, of course, but from the pleadings it was not clear
that they had a contract with each other. (Judge Rives, dissenting, thought that
there was room within the pleadings for such a contract to be shown in the allegation that Halliburton had furnished certain equipment to Norton.) The employee
sued Halliburton, who in turn, relying on Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), brought a third-party complaint against Norton. The
case arose under maritime law, since the operation was in navigable waters. Dismissal of the third-party claim was affirmed, one of the reasons being that the
lack of privity in this instance could not be surmounted by the Crumady rationale.
Judge Tuttle said:
Unless we are to say that a drilling contractor's promise to perform in a
careful and workmanlike manner inures to the benefit of the "well" itself and
thence to the suppliers of equipment to the well, it is apparent that the appellants' third-party beneficiary claim must fail. . . . It stretches credulity to
imagine that Norton's promise to the owner of the well was intended to benefit
each and every supplier of equipment to the well. While there is some logic
in holding that a stevedore's warranty is meant to benefit the owner of the
vessel, it would take the most artifical and tortuous reasoning to permit application of the third-party beneficiary theory to the facts of the instant case.
302 F.2d at 435. It is curious and unfortunate that both the majority and dissent
seemed to assume that the only ground for Crumady and Waterman S.S. Corp. v.
Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960), was the third-party beneficiary
theory. Although the dissent cites Waterman, it fails to bring out the fact that because of its facts, although not in its language, Waterman in effect downgraded the
third-party beneficiary theory and shifted major reliance to the analogy of manufacturers' liability. The court in Waterman merely quoted the entire passage on
privity from Crumady, including the passage on warranty of the soundness of a
manufactured product. Moreover, it did assert that the difference between an in rem
and in personam action was not significant in this context. But suppose Waterman
had confronted the court before Crumady. Would the court have resorted to the
third-party beneficiary idea? It seems most unlikely. In Crumady the charterer of
the ship had definite legal obligations related to the ship and running to the shipowner as well as to the vessel as the result of the charter-party agreement. But as
to a mere consignee of cargo, can it be said that he too has such an obligation and
that a part of this obligation is the enforcement for the benefit of the vessel and
vessel owner of the stevedore's duty of workmanlike performance? This seems farfetched indeed. Or, to look at the matter from the point of view of the stevedoring
company, it is possible to say that since the action in Crumady was in rem, there
was something like a privity of estate between the stevedore and the vessel. But
what privity of estate is there betwen the consignee of cargo and the vessel's
owner in relation to the stevedore's promise?
The second string to the court's bow in Crumady, however, the analogy of
manufacturer's liability, is adequate to support the result in Waterman and would
have been adequate to support a different result in Halliburton. The manufacturer's
warranty of a product is not dependent on privity, but reaches to any foreseeable
consumer. The services performed in Waterman and Halliburton if performed in
unworkmanlike fashion in breach of the stevedore's warranty to the consignee or
of the oil driller's warranty to the well owner would have consequences foreseeably
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For present purposes it is important to keep constantly in mind
that there are two questions in most of these cases: first, has the

third party any duty at all toward the employer, and second, is a
claim based on breach of that duty a claim "on account of" the com-

pensation recipient's injury? Much of the controversy just discussed
relates to the first question, which in a strict sense is not a problem

of workmen's compensation law at all. It becomes entangled with
compensation law because the exclusive-remedy principle so often
drives the third party toward casting his claim in indemnity terms.
Once the indemnity rule has been laid down in a compensation-related case, however, it is just as applicable to a case with no compen-

sation background at all. As a result, the exigencies of compensation law have quite possibly prodded indemnity law to a degree of
expansion it might never have attained if left to itself. Justice Black
had this in mind when in his dissent in Italia Societa per Azioni di
Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,68 in which the majority had
damaging to the shipowner or oil well servicing company.
The Halliburton case was relied on by Wisdom, J., in a dictum in General Elec.
Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968), a case arising in the
same circuit, but under Louisiana law rather than maritime law. General Electric
sold certain equipment with service warranties to Braun, who installed the equipment at the Nickel Company. The warranties provided that if Braun "or its
customer" discovered defects, General Electric would repair or replace the equipment
without cost to Braun or the customer. While servicing the equipment under this
warranty, an employee of General Electric was injured by the alleged negligence of
the Nickel Company, which he sued. The Nickel Company sought recovery over
from General Electric for its negligence. The court barred the recovery over on
the principal ground that there was no implied agreement to anyone to perform the
work in a careful and workmanlike manner. But even if there were, the court
says in a footnote that "we would decline to extend it beyond the immediate contracting parties, as has been done under admiralty law." Id. at 96. The court cites
its own decision in Halliburton as its rejection of extension of the third-party beneficiary concept of Crumady to cover this kind of case.
Leaving aside the many other issues in the case and concentrating only on the
issue whether lack of privity in itself should be a bar in this case if all the other
elements of a Ryan-type recovery were present and if the Ryan rule itself were accepted, one is struck by the fact that this case presents a perfect testing ground
for the second of the Supreme Court's reasons for overriding the privity objection.
Here we have the very situation the Supreme Court drew upon as an analogy-the
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of goods. As far as it goes, it is not
implied but express, and it runs to the customer of the buyer as well as to the
buyer. Now, pursuant to that obligation, the manufacturer is performing services.
If there was an obligation to perform those services in a workmanlike way, which
is the assumption made in Judge Wisdom's dictum, and if performance of services
should be analogized to sale of goods as the Supreme Court says, and if the privity
gap is overleaped in warranty of soundness of goods, should it not equally be
overleaped in warranty of workmanlike performance of services?
66 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
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held that Ryan applied even when the stevedore's supplying of defective equipment was nonnegligent, he said: "Moreover, the Court
here expands the general law of warranty in a way which I fear will
cause us regret in future cases in other areas of law as well as in
'6 7
admiralty."
There is no way of disentangling the indemnity problem from
the compensation problem of exclusive liability. If, for example,
compensation law had no exclusive-liability rule, it is possible that
much of the law that has proliferated around indemnity would rather
have been channeled into contribution. The relative rights of an
employer and third party whose defaults had contributed to the employee's injury would have been adjusted according to tort principles
of contributory and comparative negligence, and a more sensible,
equitable, and simple loss-adjustment system might have resulted.
Thanks to the exclusive-remedy rule, however, the third party's recovery-over rights have to be crammed into the mold of contractbased warranty and indemnity if they are to exist at all; it is no wonder that the mold at times appears to be bursting at the seams.
Within the federal system, at any rate, any earlier cases authorizing a tort-based distribution must now be either abandoned or
rejustified in contract-based terms. To take the example with which
this article opened, the Kittleson case, the central rationale of that
decision, which was that a primary tortfeasor had an implied obligation to indemnify a secondary tortfeasor, is discredited by Ryan and
Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema OperatingCo.6

This does

not mean, however, that the decision was wrong, or that it could not
be supported by a rationale consistent with the Ryan line of cases.
After all, there was a contract in Kittleson between the third party
and the employer under which the telephone company was doing
work on the employer packing company's roof. It would only be
necessary to add that in this contract the packing company impliedly warranted to the telephone company's employees that it would
provide a safe place in which to work, and the case is comfortably
within the modem trend. Indeed, even before Ryan, the Second
Circuit had said that this was the true ground on which Kittleson
should be explained,69 although in the Kittleson opinion this was
definitely not the court's central reliance.
67 Id. at 326.
68 355 U.S. 563 (1958) (Weyerhaeuser 11).
69 Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951).
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Outside the federal orbit, however, the question of whether
there can be noncontractual indemnity based on the implied obligation of a primary wrongdoer to a secondary is not closed. The controversy operates at both levels: whether there is such an obligation as a matter of indemnity law, and whether given such an obligation, a claim based on it is barred by the exclusive-remedy rule
as a matter of workmen's compensation law. This subject will be
examined later.
The discussion up to this point has mainly centered on the
rather negative point that a Ryan-type liability is not possible in the
absence of a contractual base. The fact that the relation between
the third party and the employer is contractual, however, does not
in itself mean that every activity carried on in relation to the contract
necessarily carries with it an implied obligation that will support an
indemnity action. This point is well illustrated by the contrast between General Electric Co. v. Moretz"0 and HaIstead v. Norfolk &
Western Railway.71 In Moretz, the employee Moretz was a truck
driver for Mason & Dixon Lines. His truck overturned while transporting certain heavy equipment belonging to General Electric. He
sued General Electric on the ground that the accident was due to its
negligence in loading and insufficiently bracing the cargo. General
Electric filed a third-party complaint against Mason & Dixon, contending that the accident was the fault of the carrier and demanding indemnity. The carrier was subject to the regulations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, one of which stated that "no motor vehicle
shall be driven unless the driver thereof shall have satisfied himself
72
that . . . all means of fastening the load are securely in place.1
Moretz reported to his employer that the load was not properly fastened, but the employer did nothing about it. The court read the ICC
regulation into the contract between the carrier and General Electric
and held that under it the carrier assumed a direct and specific obligation to General Electric to secure the cargo properly. This obligation
was found to have been breached, and an obligation to indemnify
General Electric arose.
In Halstead, the relation between employer and third party was,
in a sense, the reverse of that in Moretz. The employer in Halstead
was engaged in unloading its own property from the railway when
270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).
236 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.W. Va. 1964), afd, 350 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1965)
(applying West Virginia law).
72 49 C.F.R. § 193.9(b) (1969).
70
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its employee was injured. The railway, having been sued by the
employee, filed a third-party complaint against the employer, relying
heavily on Moretz. It cited an ICC regulation placing the responsibility for unloading on the shipper. From this the railway tried to
extract an implied duty on the part of the shipper to perform the
work in such a way as not to impose liability on the railway. The
court distinguished Moretz in several ways,7 but principally on the
ground that in Moretz the trucker was performing a service for the
third party, along with which the duty of care ran. Here the employer
was performing no service for the third party, but only for himself.
"The 'service aspect,'" said the court, "is what the Ryan doctrine is
founded on, and it was so emphasized in Crumady v. The Joachim
'4
Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S. Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed.2d 413. 7
The Halstead interpretation of Ryan, as well as that in Hill
Lines, Inc. v. PittsburghPlate Glass Co.,75 means that even if there
is a contract between employer and third party, and even if this
contract contains an implied obligation to perform certain functions
with care because of incorporation by reference of ICC regulations
or otherwise, this still does not generate a Ryan-type independent
duty unless the functions being performed were a service to the
third person under the contract. The analogy to a duty running
with a manufacturer's sale of goods, invoked in the Ryan opinion
itself, and again in Crumady is clear, with services being substituted
for goods. If no services are passing from the employer to the third
person under the contract, the analogy breaks down.
We now come to the question: what conduct by the employer
and by the third party leads to Ryan-type liability? It must first
be emphasized that the test is a relative one, not an absolute one;
that is, it must involve an examination of the conduct of both
73 E.g., there was in General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959),
not only an express jury finding that the employer's negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident, but also an express contractual obligation of the employer to
secure the cargo. Neither of these facts had a counterpart in Halstead v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., 236 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. W. Va. 1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 917 (4th Cir.
1965).
14

236 F. Supp. at 187

The court also relied on the case of Hill Lines, Inc. v.

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955), under the New Mexico
Compensation Act, in which the facts were substantially identical except that a
truck line instead of a railway played the role of third party. The trucker asserted
that the shipper employer had a duty to unload the truck in a careful and prudent
manner and that this was an independent duty running to the trucker. The Tenth
Circuit flatly rejected this theory.
75
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parties and the relation between the two. To put the matter another
way, one cannot look at the conduct of the employer alone, ignoring the third party, and reach a reliable conclusion on whether
he is liable to the third party. This might seem self-evident, but
the stress here is necessary because of dicta by the United States
Supreme Court, especially in the Italia case, that might seem inconsistent with this statement. The Court in that case said:
Recovery in contribution is imposed by law and is measured by
the relative fault of the joint tortfeasors or shared equally between
them (citing cases); while recovery in indemnity for breach of
the stevedore's warranty is based upon an agreement between the
shipowner and stevedore and is not necessarily affected or defeated by the shipowner's
negligence, whether active or passive,
70
primary or secondary.
For this last proposition the Court cites Weyerhaeuser I.
If
the Court had ended this sentence at the word "negligence," the statement would have been sound; but neither the cited case nor any other
holding of the Supreme Court or any court of appeals has ever actually held that a shipowner whose negligence was active and primary
could recover indemnity from a stevedore whose breach of warranty
of care would be equivalent of passive or secondary negligence.
Indeed, as we shall see, there is ample authority to the contrary.
What the Supreme Court forgot in this momentary lapse is that
Ryan liability involves two implied agreements: an implied agreement of workmanlike performance and an implied agreement to indemnify the shipowner in case of breach of the first agreement. As
to the first, it is of course true that the third person's conduct is immaterial, in the sense that the stevedore can breach his implied contract of workmanlike performance even if the shipowner is actively
negligent. As to the second agreement, however, it does not necessarily follow that for every breach of the implied agreement of workmanlike performance, the second agreement-that of implied indemnity-comes into play. Whether this happens does indeed depend on
the shipowner's conduct. Even an express agreement to indemnify
the third party would not indemnify him against the consequences of
his own negligence unless explicitly stated.7 How then could a mere
implied agreement give rise to a higher degree of liability?
Since the presence of some degree of negligence in the shipowner can therefore obviously not be ignored, the least controversial
76 Italia Societa per Azioni di-Navigazione, v., Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376
U.S. 315, 321 (1964).
77 See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
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category of cases is that in which the shipowner is in the usual sense
free of negligence, and in which the stevedoring company is guilty of
some breach, however minor or technical, of its warranty of workmanlike performance. This is the pattern when the shipowner has
been held liable to the employee purely on the basis of the virtually
absolute liability for damage caused by the unseaworthiness of the
vessel. The Italia case supplies the most vivid illustration of this
category. The accident here had occurred because of a latent defect,
not discoverable by ordinary care, in a rope brought onto the ship
by the stevedore employer in connection with its duties. The rope
snapped and injured the employee, who then recovered damages from
the shipowner. The ground of the recovery was that the ship was
rendered unseaworthy by the defective rope. Note that fault on the
part of the shipowner, in any sense, was absolutely zero; there was
not even anything as mild as failure to discover a defect created by
another. As to the stevedoring company, its fault was of low degree,
but still not quite zero. It had, after all, brought on board the defective rope. Even if ordinary care would not have revealed the
defect, the court points out that "latent defects may be attributable
to improper manufacture or fatigue due to long use and may be discoverable by subjecting the equipment to appropriate tests.17 8 The
Court in fact applies a relative test to the situation of the employer
and the third party, although the quality being compared is not
negligence. The comparison is between the ability of the two parties
to prevent the injury: "[Liiability should fall upon the party best
situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby to reduce the
likelihood of injury.,79
This, it may be noted, is a statement that cannot possibly be reconciled with the dictum from the same opinion, criticized above, in
which the Court said that even the shipowner's active or primary negligence would not necessarily defeat his right of indemnity. For how
could it be said that the stevedore was better situated to reduce the
likelihood of injury if the shipowner was engaged in active and primary negligence? Surely the best way to reduce the likelihood of
injury would have been to refrain from the active negligence that led
to that injury.
The court continues:
Where, as here, injury-producing and defective equipment is under the supervision and control of the stevedore, the shipowner
is powerless to minimize the risk; the stevedore is not.
78
79
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Where the shipowner is liable to the employees of the stevedore
company as well as its employees for failing to supply a vessel
and equipment free of defects, regardless of negligence, we do
not think it unfair or unwise to require the stevedore to indemnify
the shipowner for damages sustained as a result of injury-producing defective equipment supplied by a stevedore in furtherance
of its contractual obligations. s0
Thus, the Court's test is unmistakably comparative. The imposition of liability on the employer on the strength of a degree of
fault that is somewhat below conventional negligence is justified,
since the alternative is to let full liability rest upon a shipowner whose
true fault is not merely small, but nonexistent.
Up to this point, since the shipowner is wholly free of fault,
the problem of indemnifying a person for the results of his own fault
does not arise. The real complications set in when the third party
has been guilty of some degree of negligence. In sorting out the
state of the law developed in this class of cases, which are by far
the most numerous, we may first take note of one or two attempts
to place arbitrary limits on the Ryan doctrine itself.
Perhaps the narrowest compass suggested for the doctrine is the
precise fact situation under which Ryan arose-that is, the triangular
relation under admiralty law of the stevedore, the longshoreman and
the shipowner. This is the position that has been adopted by the
Fifth Circuit. As Chief Judge John R. Brown expressed it:
But the Government, as do all other parties today, when everything else fails, falls back on the Tinker-to-Evers-to-Chance
multiple impleaders in the Sieracki-Ryan-Yaka situations of indemnity based upon breach of the WWLP-the breach of the
warranty of workmanlike performance. So far this Court has
kept this newly formed concept strictly confined to salt water or
at least amphibious applications. 8 '
80 Id.
81 United States v. Seckinger, 408 F.2d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 1969).

This particular case involved an accident on dry land at a marine depot. The employee of a
contractor had obtained a judgment against the United States for injuries incurred
when he came in contact with a high voltage wire which, due to the Government's
negligence, had not been deenergized. The Government then sued the contractor
under an express contract of indemnification. The main point of the case was the
familiar one that an express contract of indemnification will not be construed to
cover the indemnitee's own negligence unless this provision is specifically stated in
the contract. But, as Judge Brown indicated, as a last resort the Government
had fallen back on the implied indemnity theory of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. PanAtlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The court not only refused 'to extend
Ryan to nonmaritime cases, but added that "the express indemnity agreement may
have waived any possible implied one." Royal Netherlands S.S. Co. v. Strachan
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The Fifth Circuit's rule limiting Ryan essentially to its own fact
situation dates from Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co.,8 2 which
refused to apply Ryan even in a case controlled by federal maritime
law, but not presenting the stevedore-longshoreman-shipowner pattern. The locus of the injury was a drilling barge in navigable waters,
but the cast of characters consisted of an oil company, a drilling
company, and an oil well servicing concern. In the earlier reference
to this case, it was noted that the court declined to follow the extension
of Ryan to nonprivity cases.83 But it went further and concluded that
to the extent that the Ryan line of cases permitted indemnification
even when the indemnitee was to some degree negligent, this rule
should be limited to stevedore-shipowner situations. It accounted
for the exceptional rule in stevedoring cases by the fact that when a
ship enters port, the stevedore must know that it may have been battered by its sea trip and, therefore, be full of hazards.84
If the Fifth Circuit is, in these cases, trying to say that the central principle of the Ryan case itself cannot be extrapolated beyond
stevedoring situations, the attempted limitation cannot be accepted.
But if what is meant is that some of the applications of Ryan to particular combinations of relative fault between stevedore and shipowner have no counterpart in cases not involving shipowners, the
position may be more defensible.
The central principle of Ryan, that there may be an implied
obligation to use care in a service contract accompanied by an implied agreement of indemnity for breach of that obligation, was not
Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1962).

See also United States v. Seckinger,

supra, at 153 n.18.
82 302 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1962). See also Delta
Eng'r Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905
(1964). In Central Stikstof Verkoopkanter v. Walsh Stevedoring Co., 380 F.2d 523
(5th Cir. 1967), the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its position, saying:
The implied warranty established in Ryan is a product of the admiralty courts

and a creature of admiralty law .

. .

.

Those cases in which the doctrine has

been applied have been admiralty cases which presented substantially similar
circumstances to those existing in Ryan.
Id. at 529. In the same year, the same court refused to apply Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), and cases following it in
a maritime situation involving repair work on a fixed, unmanned platform in the
Gulf of Mexico. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv.,
Inc., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967).
83 See note 65 supra.
84 The court cites a long vivid passage on the perils of the sea and the consequent
expectable ragged condition of a newly-arrived ship from the opinion of Judge
Mathes in Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959),
aff'd, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1960).
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originated by Ryan and has by no means been confined to maritime
or shipowner cases. The principle itself is traceable to the Westchester case,8 5 and has been applied in both state and federal courts
in a variety of situations. 8
The court in the Ocean Drilling case quotes the Supreme Court's
language in Italiato support its isolation of Ryan:
But we deal here with a suit for indemnification based upon a
maritime contract, governed by federal law . . . , in an area
where ratherspecial rules governing the obligations and liability
of shipowners prevail, rules that are designed to minimize the
hazards encountered by seamen, to compensate seamen for the
occur, and to minimize the likelihood
accidents that inevitably
81
of such accidents. 7
Note, however, that these "rather speciar' rules are concerned
not with stevedoring companies but with seamen and, of course,
8
with longshoremen under the rule in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,1
which holds that the liability of a shipowner for unseaworthiness
extends to longshoremen. The only special feature, then, of Ryantype fact situations is that the shipowner may become liable to the
longshoreman without fault under the seaworthiness doctrine. Fact
situations may therefore arise in which, as in Italia, the employer
can become liable with very little fault because the shipowner has
become liable with no fault. But fact situations may also arise-and
these are much more common-in which the shipowner was guilty
of some degree of negligence and would have been liable to the
plaintiff longshoreman even if the special seaworthiness liability did
not exist. The Ryan rule clearly applies to such cases and, this
being so, there is no reason why the Ryan rule should not be carried
over to nonshipowner situations when the actual relation between the
fault of the employer and thirdparty is the same in principle.
From the above, it can be seen that the significance of a case
in the Ryan line must be appraised, not by the minimum degree of
fault for which the shipowner could have been held liable to the
longshoreman, nor even by the theory on which the longshoreman
in fact recovered from the shipowner, but by the actual degree of
fault of the shipowner in relation to the fault of the stevedoring com85 Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278
N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
86 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), discussed at note 70 supra and the cases cited in notes 152 et seq. infra.
87 Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., Inc., 377 F.2d
511, 513 (1967) (quoting 376 U.S. at 324) (emphasis added by the court of
appeals.)
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pany. The issue is between employer and third party and must be
decided on principles of indemnity which, in turn, are governed by
their actual conduct as it bears upon their express or implied agreements.
For this reason, it is also a mistake to confine Ryan, as was
essayed in the FloridaPower and Light Co. case,"9 to cases in which
the indemnitee has been held liable without fault. The court there,
relying on the passage from Italia quoted earlier, 90 and stressing the
words "regardless of negligence," concluded:
It therefore appears that if the Ryan doctrine is extended,
it would be extended only in favor of an indemnitee who has
been held liable without fault, based on some concept of strict
liability such as unseaworthiness. 91
What the court overlooks is that the "regardless of negligence"
phrase in Italia was necessary only because of the facts of that particular case. The employer's fault was minimal, and the Supreme
Court was saying no more than that in such a case the employer could
still be held liable to a shipowner whose fault had been even less and
who had been, in fact, held liable without fault.
The quickest way to expose the fallacy of limiting Ryan to cases
in which the indemnitee has been held liable without fault is to adduce
Weyerhaeuser 11,92 in which the shipowner was indeed found by the
jury to have been negligent, and in which his liability to the longshoreman had in fact been based on negligence and not on unseaworthiness-and in which the shipowner nevertheless recovered indemnity
under Ryan. In fact, the jury actually found that the ship was not
unseaworthy as a result of the shipowner's negligence. The case is
thus clear authority for the proposition that there may be indemnity
on the part of the employer stevedore for an injury resulting from
the concurring negligence of employer and shipowner.
Having set to one side, then, two unsound efforts to encapsulate Ryan-one on the basis of a factual limitation to salt water,
shipowners and stevedores, and the other on the basis of a conceptual limitation to strict liability in the indemnitee-we are ready to
analyze the actual amount of relative fault in the employer and third
89 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427
(S.D. Fla. 1967).
90 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
91 275 F. Supp. at 430.
92 Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958)
(Weyerhaeuser 11).
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party that will sustain indemnity liability in the employer. The
Supreme Court has cautioned in Weyerhaeuser H against importing
tort terminology into the essentially contractual problem of indemnity under Ryan. Specifically, the Court ruled out the concepts of
active versus passive negligence and primary versus secondary negligence. These terms are unavoidably vague and notoriously awkward to apply in practice. Therefore, the classification here adopted
will employ the familiar distinction between creating a dangerous
condition and failing to discover it. This distinction coincides in
many typical cases with the distinction between active-primary and
passive-secondary negligence. In addition, it has the dual advantage of avoiding any reference to negligence or fault, and of turning
on a fairly specific description of conduct rather than broad adjectives.
Moreover, it covers a surprisingly high proportion of the facts of decided cases and, with a little adjustment by way of analogy, can give
guidance for the rest.
There are four principal patterns that can be identified.
The first is that in which the employer creates a dangerous condition
and the third party fails to discover it. In this situation, the employer
is liable for indemnity.
This is the fact situation in the Ryan case itself. At least it is
the fact situation on which the majority opinion is built-which is
what counts for purposes of identifying the ratio decidendi of the case.
In simplest terms, leaving aside complications in the facts to be found
in the dissent and in the courts below, the facts were that the stevedoring company negligently stowed cargo in a South Carolina port.
Officers of the shipowner observed and supervised the loading of the
entire ship and had authority to reject unsafe stowage. The same
stevedoring firm unloaded the ship a few days later in Brooklyn, at
which time a heavy roll of paper broke loose and injured the longshoreman. The longshoreman recovered damages from the shipowner on alternative grounds of negligence or unseaworthiness. The
district court dismissed the shipowner's complaint over against the
employer,93 but the court of appeals9 4 reversed and the Supreme Court
affirmed the reversal.
The Kittleson case provides another perfect illustration of this
combination of facts, 5 although the court in that opinion resorted
Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
350 U.S. 124 (1956), aff"g 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954).
95 See text accompanying note 1 supra. Other cases in this category would
include Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia., Ltd., 272 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1959); Parenzan v.
93
94
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to the concepts of primary and secondary negligence. The court
said that the creation of a dangerous condition was primary negligence
and that the mere failure to discover it was only secondary negligence.
The Ryan case has thus reached the same result on substantially
similar facts, while avoiding the use of the words "primary" and "sec-

condary" negligence.

The Ryan opinion merely says:

"[T]he con-

tractor, as the warrantor of its own services, cannot use the shipowner's failure to discover and correct the contractor's own breach
of warranty as a defense."
The Italia case 97 also properly falls in this category. One can
epitomize the facts in that case by saying that the employer created
a dangerous condition by bringing on board a defective rope, and
that the shipowner failed to discover the defect. Of course, it may
be doubted whether the shipowner was under any duty at all to discover the defect-but even if he was, his failure would not, under this
analysis, offset the employer's active conduct in creating the danger.
It must be stressed again that the qualifying word "negligently" does
not appear in any of these formulations. If the stevedore in fact
furnished the rope and its defective condition in fact created the
danger, and if the shipowner in fact contributed no more to the
accident than, at most, failing to discover the danger, the case for

indemnity is complete.
Iino Kaiun Kaisya, 251 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 939 (1958).
Weyerhaeuser SS. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958) (Weyerhaeuser 11), is difficult to classify, but probably belongs here, because the court
identifies this type of shipowner default as the one which clearly would have permitted a recovery like that in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.,
350 U.S. 124 (1956). See the last sentence of the quotation in the text accompanying note 115 infra. The facts of the case were that the stevedoring firm had
worked on the shipowner's vessel in New York, and apparently had built a winch
shelter out of scrap lumber for protection from the weather. This was quite
customary, but on this occasion the ramshackle winch shelter was left on the ship
while the ship proceeded to Boston. In Boston, the same stevedoring company
again went to work on the ship. Five days after the ship arrived in Boston, one of
its employees was injured when a piece of wood fell from the winch shelter and
struck him. The court reversed a directed verdict for the stevedoring company in
the suit by the shipowner for recovery over of damages paid by the shipowner to
the injured longshoreman. It directed the trial court to try the various issues between the shipowner and the stevedoring company bearing on the alleged failure
of the stevedoring company to live up to the implied duty of care referred to in the
Ryan case.
96 350 U.S. at 134-35.
97 Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S.
315 (1964).
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The second category is that in which the position of the parties is
reversed: the third party creates a dangerous condition, and the employer fails to discover it. The holding here is that the employer is not
liable to the third party for indemnity.
The leading example in this category is the pre-Ryan case of
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Matthews. 98 In this
case, the Second Circuit considered a claim for contribution brought
by a third party against an employer, which grew out of a compensable accident resulting from the failure of a defective rope. The
third party's negligence consisted in furnishing the defective rope,
while the employer's consisted in failing to discover the defect. The
court denied both contribution and indemnity, distinguishing both the
Westchester case and Rich v. United States99 on the ground that the
present case involved no duty running from the employer to the
third party. The duty to inspect the rope was a duty only toward his
own employee, not toward the third party who furnished the rope.
To say that the employer had a duty toward the supplier would be
to say that the employer agreed to indeninify the supplier for the
results of the supplier's own negligence in furnishing defective rope.
The court observed that it would be"utterly unreasonable" to imply
promises by the stevedoring company that "he will not use equipment furnished him by the shipowner to be used for the very purpose
to which it was put," or "that he will use care to detect any defect in
the equipment which patently existed when the equipment was delivered for use by the employer." There is also a post-Ryan case
which is the mirror image of Italia: Ignatyuk v. Tramp Chartering
Corp., °00 in which the court said that the stevedoring company's
implied warranty of workmanlike performance does not require it
"to discover defects in the apparatus or equipment furnished by the
vessel being loaded or unloaded which are not obvious upon a
cursory inspection."'' 1 In that case, the stevedoring company was
98 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950). See also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Naquin, 414
F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that indemnity is not available to an actively
negligent third party).
99 177 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'g 81 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
100 250 F.2d 198 (1957).
101 Id. at 201. The court cites the following cases in support of this statement: Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 95 (1946); Shannon v. United
States, 235 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1956); Gucciardi v. Chisholm, 145 F.2d 514 (2d
Cir. 1944); Liverani v. John T. Clark & Son, 231 N.Y. 178, 131 N.E. 881 (1921).
See also Pena v. A/S Dovrefjell, 176 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (making a
similar holding as to failure to discover a weakness in a place of dunnage which
broke under the longshoreman's weight).
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held not liable to discover a latent defect in a cleat and in a rope.
The third category begins like the second, but takes a different
turn that makes the issue much closer: the third party creates a dangerous condition; the employer discovers it but continues work. The
majority of cases hold that to continue under these circumstances is
in itself a breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike service. 10
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, reached a contrary conclusion in Hagans v. Farrell Lines, Inc.0 3 in which both
the shipowner and the stevedoring company knew that a winch was
defective. Nevertheless, the winch was used thereafter for some
time. The court held that while the stevedoring company's use of the
defective winch might prevent it from recovering indemnity from
the shipowner for compensation benefits, "it does not necessarily follow that the burden to indemnify is thereby created." Smith v. Pan
Atlantic Steamship Corp.10 4 reached a similar result on the authority
of the Hagans case. The court added: "Is it part of the stevedoring
contract that the stevedore will walk off the job if he finds the
ship's equipment unsuitable?" The court added: "It may be negligent for him not to do so but it is in furtherance of his contract
rather than a breach of it, and the shipowner could hardly hold him
liable for trying to complete the work."
Here we see the divorce from negligence carried to its logical
conclusion. The issue is not negligence at all; it is whether the conduct, in all the circumstances, is in line with what the parties may
102 Frasca v. S/S Safina E. Ismail, 413 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1969) (failure by
stevedore to correct a visible danger left by the shipowner held to be a breach of the
warranty of workmanlike service-actually, both the shipowner and the stevedore
had failed to discover the visible danger); American President Lines Ltd. v.
Marine Terminals Corp., 234 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 926 (1956);
United States v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950)
(holding that the stevedore's conduct in permitting his men to work under known
dangerous conditions created by the third person could therefore recover full indemnity from the employer); Pacific Far East Line v. California Stevedoring &
Ballast Co., 238 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Misurella v. Isthmian Lines, 215 F.
Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Nordeutsher Lloyd, Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 F. Supp. 680 (D. Ore. 1961); Drago v. A/S Inger, 194 F. Supp. 398
(E.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 305 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1962); Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselsakbet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), affd with adoption of trial
court's facts and conclusions, Metropolitan Stevedoring Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960); Raskin
v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
1oa 237 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1956).
104 161 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1957), affd per curiam, 254 F.2d 600 (3d
Cir. 1958).
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be deemed to have agreed upon under their contract. Furthermore,
as this court held, there is no inherent reason why it may not be
reasonable to conclude that the shipowner really intended, and impliedly agreed, that the stevedore should proceed under circumstances that amounted to legal negligence, when the alternative was
that the work might not have been done at all.
The fact that the stevedore continues work in spite of discovery of a dangerous condition created by the employer is, a fortiori, no ground for imposing indemnity liability on the stevedore if
the continuance of the work was at the orders of the shipowner. 10 5
In a fifth circuit case, 10 the longshoremen had called the attention
of the ship's mate to an unsafe condition in the form of loose dunnage covered by paper. They were told to go ahead anyway, build
cargo to the height of the dunnage and work over it. A longshoreman was injured when his leg broke through a hole in the paper.
The court concluded that the shipowner's conduct was sufficient
"to preclude recovery of indemnity" under what has come to be called
07
the "Weyerhaeuser dictum."
The fourth combination has a still different twist: the third
party creates a dangerous condition which is latent; the employer
does more than merely fail to discover it or continue in the face of
it; he activates it by his own affirmative conduct. In the Crumady
case, 08 the shipowner had created an unseaworthy condition by setting a safety cutoff device of a winch at six tons despite the fact that
three tons was the maximum safe working load of the equipment.
What really precipitated the accident, however, was the stevedore's
conduct in moving the head of the boom in such a way as to place
an abnormal strain on the equipment creating a strain far in excess
of three tons. The Supreme Court held that the principle of the
Ryan case applied, "since the negligence of the stevedores, which
brought the unseaworthiness of the vessel into play, amounted
to a breach of the warranty of workmanlike service .

...

",,09

105 Compania Anonima Venezolano de Navegacion v. Matthews, 371 F.2d 971
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967); Thompson v. Trent Maritime Co., 353
F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1965); Moore-McCormack Lines v. Maryland Ship Ceiling Co.,
311 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1962); Hodgson v. Lloyd Brasileiro Patrimonio Nacional, 294
F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1961); United States v. Harrison, 245 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1957);
Torres Cruz v. Hudson S.S. Co., 206 F. Supp. 216 (D. P. R. 1962).
106 Compania Anonima Venezolano de Navegacion v. Matthews, 371 F.2d 971
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967).
107 See discussion in text accompanying note 115 et seq. infra.
108 Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
109 Id. at 429.
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But even if the stevedoring company was negligent, and even if its
negligence "brought into play" the dangerous condition created by
the shipowner, the stevedore will not be liable in indemnity if in all
the circumstances his conduct, in its interplay with the conduct of the
shipowner, was not a breach of his implied warranty of workmanlike performance.
It may be wondered how this fourth combination could come
about. The most direct way is for a jury to find, in answer to specific
interrogatories, that this is what happened, as in Waterman Steamship Corp. v. David.110 The accident occurred when a hatch cover,
being pulled back by the stevedore's employees, jumped the track
because of its worn condition and fell on the plaintiff longshoreman.
In answer to specific interrogatories, the jury found (1) that the
proximate cause of the accident was the unseaworthiness of the roller
assembly, (2) that the stevedoring company was negligent, and (3)
that its negligence "caused or brought into play" the vessel's unseaworthiness. Up to this point, the shipowner's case for indemnity
would have been perfect within the Crumady case. But the jury
did not stop there. In the next interrogatory it found that the negligence did not consitute a breach of the stevedore's warranty to perform its job in a reasonably safe and workmanlike manner. Finally
the jury specifically found that the shipowner's breach of his seaworthiness duty was "so great as to preclude" the shipowner's recovery from the stevedore for breach of warranty. The three last
interrogatories were obviously carefully tailored by counsel to match
the doctrines of the three leading cases involved: Crumady, Ryan,
and Weyerhaeuser I. The shipowner was ahead under the Crumady formula, but lost on both the central Ryan principle and the
"Weyerhaeuser dictum."
The shipowner contended that the answers were inconsistent
with each other, and the court at once addressed itself to this issue.
It began with the canon that it is the "duty of the courts to attempt
to harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of
them," and "to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis if necessary
. . .before we are free to disregard the jury's verdict and remand
the case for a new trial.""' The court achieved this reconciliation
by harking back to the dominant theme of Ryan: the indemnity
obligation rests on contract, not tort. Therefore the law of contract,
110 353 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1965).
-11 Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963) (as quoted in
353 F.2d at 664).
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not of negligence, determines what conduct under the Weyerhaeuser
dictum would be "sufficient to preclude recovery." The court recalled that the Weyerhaeuser II opinion had adduced the sections
of the Restatement of Contracts1 2 dealing with the promisee's
hindrance of the promisor's performance of the latter's duty. Thus,
Section 295 provides:
If a promisor prevents or hinders.., the performance of a return
promise, and the . . .return promise (would have) been rendered except for such prevention or hindrance . . .the actual
or threatened nonperformance of the return duty does not discharge the promisor's duty ....
Then comes the nub of the decision:
.These contract principles are implicit in the Weyerhaeuser
dictum. If a vessel's unseaworthiness prevents the stevedore's
workmanlike performance, that is "conduct" on the part of the
shipowner "sufficient to preclude recovery,"
and to excuse even
13
a negligent breach by the stevedore.1
The court concludes by saying that this was a question for the jury.
In support of this conclusion, the court quotes Weyerhaeuser II:
The evidence bearing on these issues-petitioner's [owner's]
action in making the shelter or its ship available to respondent's
employees in Boston although it was apparently unsafe, as well
as respondent's [stevedore's] continued use of the shelter for five
days without inspection-was for jury consideration under appropriate instructions.- 4
It is in the last three words, "under appropriate instructions," that the
real difficulty lies buried. What would appropriate instructions be?
Neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals at this writing
has faced up to the task of providing an overall affirmative working
rule on what it would take to constitute "conduct on . [the] part
. . . [of the shipowner] sufficient to preclude recovery." In the
Weyerhaeuser II case itself, the Supreme Court was under no such
necessity, since it was dealing with a directed verdict for the stevedore.
Hence it merely had to conclude that there might have been some kind
of negligence that would not necessarily prevent recovery by the shipowner. The Court said:
While the jury found petitioner "guilty of some act of negli112 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs

(FrsT) §§ 295 & 315 (1932).

See also A.

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 571, 947, & 1264 (1952).
113 353 F.2d at 665. The court then goes on to cite Reddick v. McAllister

Lighterage Line, Inc., 258 F.2d 297 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958),
for the proposition that a finding of fault in the stevedore does not necessarily require a judgment of indemnity in the shipowner's favor.
114 355 U.S. at 567.
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gence," that ultimate finding might have been predicated, inter
alia, on a failure of petitioner to remove the shelter when the
ship left New York, or a failure to correct or warn respondent of
a latent dangerous condition known to petitioner when the respondent began the Boston unloading. Likewise, the finding
might have been predicated on a failure of petitioner during the
five days in Boston to inspect the shelter, detect and correct the
unsafe condition. Although any of these possibilities could provide Connolly [the claimant] a basis of recovery, at least the latter would not, under Ryan, prevent recovery by petitioner in the
third-party action.11 5
It will be observed that the Court is willing to state unqualifiedly
that the shipowner's failure to inspect the dangerous condition after
the ship was turned over to the stevedoring company in Boston was
not sufficient to prevent recovery over by the shipowner. Nevertheless, the Court is in sufficient doubt about the boundaries of the
shipowner's liability to stop short of making a similar declaration as
to failure of the shipowner to correct the dangerous condition earlier
-particularly in the light of the apparent custom of removing these
temporary shelters when the ship put to sea.
In attempting to supply the need for "appropriate instructions,"
it should first always be remembered that the beginning point here is
the contract between the stevedoring company and the shipowner.
Since everything about the liabilities back and forth between the two
parties must be derived from contract, a court must look to it to discover what kind of misconduct by the shipowner will preclude him
from recovering over against the employer. As a next step, we may
identify two kinds of conduct that are not sufficient to preclude
recovery over. One, on the strength of the Weyerhaeuser passage
just quoted, is failure to discover a dangerous condition created by
the stevedore.
It appears equally clear that the required level of shipowner
misconduct would not be satisfied by the technical violation of the
shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. Liability for unseaworthiness runs to the shipper of cargo, to seamen and to longshoremen, but it does not extend to the stevedoring contractor."1 "
115 Id. at 568. See also Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, rehearing denied, 369 U.S. 882 (1962), which does not add
substantially to existing law, since the jury's verdict, finding the stevedoring com-

pany not liable, was not impossible as a matter of law on at least one theory which
the jury might have favored.
116
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There is a practical reason for this, which is effectively presented by
the district court's opinion in Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International.117 The court provides a vivid description of how the
hazards of the sea, even under modem conditions, can still shake
up and batter a ship, so that by the time it arrives in port to be worked
on by longshoremen, it would be quite unreasonable to postulate that
the stevedoring company expects the ship to be in seaworthy condition or even in a reasonably safe condition.
The most thorough attempt to formulate a positive set of tests
is that contained in the Hugev opinion. Unfortunately the court of
appeals, in affirming the decision, merely adopted the facts and conclusions. For that reason, this particular language is not part of the
ratio decidendi of the case beyond the district court level. The
tests adopted by the district court were as follows:
The surrounding circumstances of fact, and that of law just
recited, prompt the holding that, absent express provision to the
contrary, the shipowner owes to the stevedoring contractor under
the stevedoring contract the implied-in-fact obligations: (1) To
exercise ordinary care under the circumstances to place the ship
on which the stevedoring work is to be done, and the equipment
and appliances aboard ship, in such condition that an expert and
experienced stevedoring contractor, mindful of the dangers he
should reasonably expect to encounter, arising fom the hazards of
the ship's service or otherwise, will be able by the exercise of
ordinary care under the circumstances to load or discharge the
cargo, as the case may be, in a workmanlike manner and with
reasonable safety to persons and property; and (2) to give the
stevedoring contractor reasonable warning of the existence of
any latent or hidden danger which has not been remedied and is
not encountered or reasonably to be expected by an expert and
experienced stevedoring company in the performance of the
stevedoring work aboard the ship, if the shipowner actually
knows, or, in the exercise of ordinary care in the circumstances,
should know of the existence of such danger, and the danger is
one which the shipowner should reasonably expect a stevedoring
contractor to encounter in the performance of the stevedoring
contract.""
This passage was quoted by the United States Supreme Court in
a different context-that of the stevedore's attempt in Burnside"9 to
601 (1959), af'd sub nom., Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet
Int'l, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
117 Id.
118 170 F. Supp. at 610.
119 Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404
(1969).
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assert a right of action over against the shipowner, independent of the
stevedore's subrogation rights in the employee's cause of action.
However, since it would be rather awkward, to say the least, to have
one standard of shipowner fault for purposes of supporting shipowner liability to the stevedore under Burnside, and a different standard for barring shipowner recovery from the stevedore under Ryan,
the quotation of this set of tests by the Supreme Court may provide a
start toward filling the void of "appropriate instructions" left by
Weyerhaeuser I. Of course, the Supreme Court's mere reproduction
of this passage in a footnote is not tantamount to adopting it; all the
Court in Burnside was trying to do at that point was to show that there

was some recognized duty running from shipowner to stevedore.
Nevertheless, while the Court did not expressly approve the tests in
Hugev, it did not disapprove them either-and their weight has certainly been enhanced by this high-level recognition.
It may be suggested, then, that a court or counsel confronting
the task of preparing instructions to the jury in this class of cases has
120
a fair amount of guidance, when all the sources are pieced together.
Although the point seems not to have been raised in the Waterman
case, 12 it seems wrong to submit to the jury the question of whether
the shipowner's breach of seaworthiness "was so great as to preclude
it" from recovering indemnity, without any instructions on what
degree of breach would satisfy the test. The Court in Waterman
quotes Weyerhaeuser II in support of the holding that it is the jury's
120 Of course, the instructions appropriate to the case will be tailored to the
facts of the particular litigation. In most situations, the set of four categories
identified in the text above, constructed around the concepts of creating or failing
to discover a dangerous condition, would meet the need and have the advantage
of concreteness. However, there could usually be substituted other degrees of actual
negligence, such as knowing of a dangerous condition that is not reasonably discoverable by others and failing to reveal it, without disturbing the pattern. Any
such instruction, however, would have to be accompanied by a warning that this
element cannot be supplied by the technical liability of the shipowner for unseaworthiness of the vessel; it is the character of the shipowner's conduct leading to
unseaworthiness that is relevant. At this point the general tests laid down in
Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601 (1959), aff'd sub nom.,
Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960), may be found to be useful. For completeness,
there should be added an instruction drawn from the law of contracts as reflected in
the passages from the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (FIRST) §§ 295 & 315 (1932).
The jury should be told that the shipowner has, under a normal contract, a duty
to refrain from hindering the stevedore in an unreasonable manner from the performance of its work and the discharge of its duty to perform the work in a
workmanlike manner.
121 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. David, 353 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1965).

Workmen's Compensation: Third Party Actions
task to answer this question, but is blind to the last three words,
"under appropriate instructions." If there were any instructions to
the jury, the opinion does not reveal it. Weyerhaeuser II surely
never meant to say that the whole complex snarl of issues in this
area-which have been keeping federal courts busy for years-should
be ducked by tossing the problem to an uninstructed jury. The result
is bound to be the kind of puzzle confronting the court in Waterman,
where it bravely and ingeniously struggled to find a thread of legal
consistency in the findings, which it then imputed to a jury that could
not have possibly devised or even understood such a sophisticated
legal rationale.
Stevedore Employer's Action Over Against Longshoreman Employee
Since the stevedore employer, in the first wave of Ryan-based
cases, was usually the party that wound up with the ultimate burden
of liability, it is not surprising that he began to cast about for ways
of passing it on to someone else. The resulting proliferation of claims
and cross claims in this area has inspired some more-than-usually
picturesque judicial prose. Judge John R. Brown has contributed
22
his share. Concurring in McLendon v. Charente Steamship Co.,
he said: "The plight of stevedore-employer caught in the SierackiRyan-Yaka maelstrom is indeed an unhappy one undoubtedly deserving of congressional solicitude." In United States Lines Co. v.
Williams,123 he varies and mixes the metaphor somewhat, referring
to "the hundreds of amphibious Tinkers-to-Evers-to-Chance judicial
round robins churned by the swells of Sieracki-Ryan-Yaka-Italia."
24
A few pages later in the same volume, in DIS Ove Skou v. Hebert,
he outdoes his previous effort both in the pungency and the mix of
his triple metaphor:
This is another of the growing number of multiparty Donnybrook Fairs in which like Kilkenny cats . . . all lash out
against each other in the hope that someway from someone,
somehow all or part of1 25the Sieracki-Ryan-Yaka-Italia fallout can
be visited on another.
The two principal attempts by the stevedore to pass the burden
to someone else have been a counterclaim against the negligent long348 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1965).
365 F.2d 332, 333 (5th Cir. 1966).
124 365 F.2d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1966). For another opinion by Judge John
R. Brown on a tangle of cross-claims, see Grigsby v. Costal Marine Serv. of Tex.,
Inc., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969).
122

123

125 365 F.2d at 344.
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shoreman-employee himself and, more recently, an independent suit
for indemnity against the shipowner, as in Burnside.12 6 At this point,
we may examine the comparatively recent burst of cases in which the
employer has attempted to shift the ultimate burden of damage liability all the way back to the longshoreman-plaintiff himself. These
cases arise when the longshoreman who was injured happens to be
the same longshoreman whose negligence contributed to the unseaworthiness which caused his injury.
To a lawyer trained in conventional concepts of master-servant
law, it might come as a surprise that there could be any doubt about
the liability of the tortfeasor employee to pay for his own wrong, if
he can. Although Lord Holt, the father of respondeat superior, at
first held that a servant was not himself answerable in tort for negligence, 127 it soon became established in both England and the United
States that a servant is not only liable for his negligence to a third
person, but also liable to his master, if the master has had to pay
damages resulting solely from the servant's fault. 28
The existence of this rule of law was all but forgotten inasmuch
as normally the servant would not be able to pay a judgment; but
this did not destroy the rule itself. When for some special reason,
such as the coverage of the employee by automobile liability insurance,
the employee is indeed able to respond in damges, the principle has
been remembered and revived. Thus, although the legal basis is
somewhat different, recoveries have been had by employers against
their own employees as third parties when the
tortfeasor employee
29
employee.
compensation-claimant
the
injured
in the Ryan-type case, the ability of the employee to pay a judgment is ensured by the fact that the whole cycle begins with his obtaining a judgment from the third-party shipowner.1 0 There is thus
no financial obstacle to reposing terminal liability on the true tortfeasor. The issue, therefore, becomes one of reexamining the conventional rule in the light of modem conditions and concepts126 See note 65 supra.
127 Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 488 (T. 13 W Il) (1701).
128 Grand Trunk Ry. v. Latham, 63 Me. 177 (1874).
129 See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 72.10 (Supp.

1969) at note 15 et seq. supra.
180 In this respect the present issue is readily distinguishable from the question
whether the employer should be allowed to implead the acting employee when
there is no visible financial reason. See Goodhart v. United States Lines Co., 26
F.R.D. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also cases cited in id., at 164, in the footnote
marked with an asterisk.
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including the intervention of nonfault workmen's compensation liability, nonfault unseaworthiness liability, and the total set of relationships created by Congress and the courts surrounding maritime
and longshore injuries. At this writing, no record of a successful suit
by an employer against his longshoreman-employee has appeared in
the reports; all but one of the reported cases have ruled out this
type of suit.' 31 The remaining case' 3 2 did not affirmatively pass on
the merits of such a suit but merely declined to dismiss it, stressing
the rule that all possible parties to a controversy should be joined in
the interest of judicial efficiency. The law up to this point has
been made mostly in federal district courts and must, therefore, be
viewed as being still in a formative stage.
33
The case that started the discussion on its present course1
was Cavelleri v. Isthmian Lines, Inc. 34 The heart of that opinion
lies in the concept that since the longshoreman's recovery from the
shipowner is reduced in proportion to the percentage of the longshoreman's contributory negligence, that negligence is "excised"
from the litigation and can no longer be attributed to the longshoreman for purposes of the stevedore's counterclaim. Suppose, to take
35
the actual facts in the later case of Cusumano v. Wilhelmsen,1
1'1 Nicroli v. Den Norske Afrika-og Australielinie Wilhelmsens Dampskibsaktieselskab, 332 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1964); Cusumano v. Wilhelsen, 267 F. Supp. 164
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Feeney v. National Dev. Co., 228 F. Supp. 731 (D. Mass. 1964);
Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank, 202 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Cavelleri
v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rehearing denied,
190 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Cook v. The MV Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464
(D. Ore. 1960).
132 Malfitano v. King Line, Ltd., 198 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also
the footnoted observation of Judge Friendly, dissenting in Shenker v. United States,
322 F.2d 622, 630 n.1 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907 (1964): "Perhaps
the circle will be completed by the stevedoring company's recovering from Shenker
for breach of his undertaking to keep his eyes open implicit in his contract of employment." Of course, no judicial expression can be technically much weaker than
a dictum within a dissent, and the second circuit later, in Nicroli v. Den Norske
Afrika-og Australielinie Wilhelsens Dampskibsaktieselskab, 332 F.2d 651 (2d Cir.
1964), made short work of the issue, acknowledging Judge Friendly's "hyperbolic
footnote" merely as the evident inspiration for the stevedore's attempt.
'33 Historically, the first case involving an effort to transfer liability to the longshoreman appears to have been Cook v. The MV Wasaborg, 189 F. Supp. 464 (D.
Ore. 1960), but the theory relied on by the stevedore was somewhat out of the
mainstream that developed in subsequent cases. The stevedore contended that the
employee was in effect a vice-principal and as such should bear the full judgment The court found that the precedents relied on involved persons who were
the alter ego of the corporation, which was not the case with this employee.
134 189 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). For complete names and citations of
cases in the ensuing discussion, see notes 131 and 132 supra.
'35 267 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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the total assessed damages were $119,000 and the plaintiff's negligence 60 percent. The plaintiff's recovery would be reduced to
$47,600, as was actually done in that case. If the shipowner then
recovers the $47,600 from the stevedore, the basis must be something other than the longshoreman's negligence, so this theory runs.
Therefore, the $47,600 that the stevedore tries to recoup from his
longshoreman-employee cannot be viewed as related to the stevedore's negligence.
This theory, while not free from serious weaknesses as a matter
of law, 136 can at least be conceptually defended when the accident
was not caused by the sole negligence of the longshoreman. For
example, if the negligence of the stevedore through other employees
was a factor, it can be argued that the $47,600 represented this
residuum of negligence remaining after plaintiffs negligence had
been excised.
The really awkward problem arises when the longshoreman's
negligence is the sole cause of the unseaworthiness that resulted in
his injury. In Cusumano the longshoreman moved to dismiss the
stevedore's counterclaim against him; the stevedore's allegation that
the longshoreman's negligence was the sole cause of its being held
liable to the shipowner presumably must be taken to be true. When
the court discusses the issue on this assumption, however, the "excision" theory backfires. If the longshoreman's negligence had been
excised, how could it have still served as the sole basis for the stevedore's liability to the shipowner? To put the matter another way,
the shipowner has benefited once by the longshoreman's negligence,
by having the damages against himself reduced by 60 percent. He
then benefits again by using the same negligence to achieve a recovery
over against the stevedore.
The court's answer is that this argument would more properly
have been directed to the contest between the stevedore and the shipowner than to that between the stevedore and the longshoreman.
But the difficulty in reducing or blocking the shipowner's recovery
against the stevedore, says the court, lies in the fact that this recovery
is based on indemnity and is, therefore, not necessarily defeated by
Proudfoot, supra note 60, at 441 says:
This is simply semantic nonsense. The same act, negligent or otherwise, can
constitute a violation of independent duties owed to different parties. Thus the
fact that the negligence of the plaintiff breaches a duty to the shipowner and
results in a reduction in his award is no reason that the same negligence cannot constitute a breach of duty to the stevedore based upon an implied warranty of workmanlike performance running from the longshoreman to the
stevedore.
136
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the shipowner's negligence. 137
The real trouble here is that one is trying to make legal sense

out of a mixture of jury findings and pleadings that cannot be reconciled.

In Cusumano, our given quantities are: the shipowner was

not negligent; the ship was unseaworthy; the longshoreman's negligence in creating the unseaworthiness was 60 percent; the stevedore

was not negligent except through this same longshoreman. Where
then is the other 40 percent of negligence? Obviously rational legal
rules cannot be based upon irrational fact combinations like this.
The next case after Cavelleri to undertake an analysis in depth
of this problem was Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank.18 One

or two added factors received attention in this opinion.

The steve-

dore in Johnson argued that just as there was an implied warranty of
workmanlike performance running from the stevedore to the shipowner, so too there was an implied warranty running from the longshoreman hatch boss to the stevedore that the former would work in
such a way as not to saddle his employer with liability. The court rejected this argument out of hand-in spite of its appeal to consis-

tency and logic-on the ground that the Ryan implied warranty was
purely an attempt to reach an appropriate adjustment of loss between
the stevedore and the shipowner as to their mutual relation to the

longshoreman. In fact, in the last analysis the decisions in this
category will be found to be largely policy-based,3 9 with traditional
137 The court cites Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D.
Va. 1960), a case in which it was apparently held that a longshoreman can recover against a shipowner even when his own negligence was the sole cause of the
unseaworthiness, as support for this proposition. The court also suggests that apportionment between the shipowner and the stevedore of the residual damages after
reduction by the plaintiff's negligence might be possible, although in this case it
was not because the stevedore had withdrawn its counterclaim against the shipowner-a possibility also suggested in D/S Ove Skou v. Hebert, 365 F.2d 341 (5th
Cir. 1966). One can now add that, under Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v.
Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969), the stevedore might have still another
route by which to seek an adjustment of the loss.
138 202 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
139 The court relies heavily, to support its general policy, on the holding of
United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954), which held that the United States is
not entitled to recover indemnity from one of its employees for whose negligence
it had been held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. As a legal precedent,
the case is rather far afield since it turns entirely on the construction of a particular
statute that created the tort liability in the first place and that omitted the feature of recovery over against the employee. Even as to policy, the situation is
quite different. The Court in Gilman paints a Dickensian picture of a harassed
employee being hounded and put to great expense for legal fees by the big, wicked
government. In the present situation, however, one finds a longshoreman al-
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legal concepts and logic giving way where necessary. The Johnson
opinion sets the stage for this approach by a quotation from Sieracki:
"And beyond this he [the shipowner] is in a position, as the worker
community which receives
is not, to distribute the loss in the shipping
140
cost.'
its
bear
the service and should
This language may seem to have a familiar ring. It is the original formula used to justify the policy desirability, and constitutional
validity, of legislative action creating nonfault workmen's compensation liability for limited benefits. Here the same language is used to
justify the judicial provision of nonfault shipowner liability for unlimited damages to the longshoreman. It is then requoted to justify
letting the longshoreman keep the recovery despite his own negligence-and this at the expense of an employer who has already discharged his full social responsibility by paying the longshoreman nonfault compensation benefits based on precisely the same social theory.
The court then introduces the argument that to allow recovery
against the longshoreman would, in effect, restore the full defense of
contributory negligence and deprive him of the benefit of the comparative negligence rule. If his negligence was only a partial cause
of the accident, and if the stevedore was allowed full recovery over
against him, this would be true. To revert to the figures in Cusumano, if out of total damages of $119,000, plaintiff received $47,600
because he was 60 percent negligent, and if the stevedore finally
recouped $47,600 from him, he would indeed be paying as if his
negligence had been 100 percent responsible. It has been suggested that, in these circumstances, the stevedore should recover from
the longshoreman only 40 percent of $47,600.'4' This would make
sense if the remaining 40 percent of fault is presumed to be in the
shipowner. If it were in the stevedore, however, no recovery at all
would be justifiable. Once more it is clear that the place to adjust
this remaining portion of the loss is between the stevedore and shipowner; if this is not done, it will be difficult to achieve equity by
42
tinkering with the rights between stevedore and longshoreman.
ready well-represented by counsel, who have probably won him a verdict in five or
six figures. If there is any harassment in the picture, it is not the longshoreman
who is its victim.
140 202 F. Supp. at 861, quoting from Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85, 94-95 (1946).
'4'
Proudfoot, supra note 60, at 439-42.
142 Another argument relied on in Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank, 202 F.
Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), deserves little weight. This is the contention that since
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If this field of law is to develop soundly, more attention will have
to be given to some important variables that are now often slighted
-particularly those touching the character and quantity of the longshoreman's negligence.
Suppose the holding in this type of case is paraphrased as follows: plaintiff by his own negligence creates an unseaworthy condition; as a result of this condition he is injured; both the shipowner
and the stevedore are innocent of negligence; the longshoreman recovers $60,000 from the shipowner-this amount representing his
injuries reduced by this contributory negligence; the shipowner gets
$60,000 indemnity from the stevedore by attributing the longshoreman's negligence to him; but the stevedore must not be allowed to recover the $60,000 back from the tortfeasor longshoreman. In short,
the guilty party ends with $60,000 and the innocent employer, already having paid workmen's compensation and supposedly protected by its exclusive liability clause, is left "holding the bag." Put
in this way, the result would strike most lawyers as indefensible.

The trouble with this picture is that in most cases the longshoreman's
negligence is not the sole cause of his injury. Moreover, his negligence is seldom of the direct and culpable variety that this paraphrase
suggests. In almost every case the injured man is a supervisory em-

ployee, such as a hatch boss. His negligence is not in some physical
movement of his own, 4 3 but in the fact that something has been done
the longshoreman's right to sue his employer is barred by the compensation act, it
is anomalous to permit the employer to sue the longshoreman. The fallacy is
that the employee has not lost his right to sue his employer; he has recovered once
from him directly in workmen's compensation, and a second time, indirectly, by a
recovery against a third party which in fact has been paid by the employer. The
recovery over against the employee, far from flouting the exclusive-remedy concept
of workmen's compensation, is designed to restore it by cancelling out the second
of these recoveries.
143 The fact that the quality of plaintiffs fault is definitely relevant is demonstrated when one examines the result in cases involving actual assaults by employees. The unseaworthiness doctrine has been expanded to permit recovery by a
seaman for injuries caused by the assault of a fellow seaman. Boudoin v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955). Several decisions have allowed the shipowner defendant to implead the assaulting seaman on the ground that he is the
primary tortfeasor and the shipowner only the secondary tortfeasor. States S.S.
Co. v. Howard, 180 F. Supp. 461 (D. Ore. 1960); Codrington v. United States Lines
Co., 168 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Thompson v. American Export Lines, Inc.,
15 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court in Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank,
202 F. Supp. 859, 865 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), distinguished these cases, saying:
To perm:t impleader of the assaulter, .and thereby bring into the action a third
person who acted intentionally, is different in principle from allowing a defendant to assert a claim that would if successful, defeat the recovery of a plaintiff
who was at most negligent.
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under his supervision that he should have discovered and corrected.
Or, as in Nicroli,'44 it may merely have been failure to look where he
was going when he slipped on a deck made dangerous by sugar spilled
by others. The jury reduced his damages by 50 percent on account
of this contributory negligence. Now, suppose the stevedore had recovered over against the plaintiff. The end result would have been
that the plaintiff would have recovered nothing, while those who
were responsible for the creation of the dangerous condition in the
first place would have had their liability lightened at plaintiff's expense. It is small wonder that the Second Circuit consumed only
one short paragraph in rejecting the stevedore's counterclaim.
The optimum disposition of these cases would be this: first, if
the plaintiffs negligence was really the sole cause of the vessel's unseaworthiness that led to his injury, although he theoretically still has
a cause of action against the shipowner, his recovery should be reduced by 100 percent. No other result is legally rational. Second, if
plaintiff's negligence was only partly responsible, say 60 percent, his
damages should be reduced accordingly and he should have no further
liability. Third, the remaining adjustment of rights between shipowner and stevedore should be concerned exclusively with the 40
percent actually paid. If, for example, in Nicroli the slippery condition of the deck was due to the stevedore's failure to perform his duty
through other employees, the shipowner should have his indemnity.
Conversely, if it was the shipowner's duty to clear up the slippery condition, he should absorb the 40 percent himself. If both were in
default on their obligations-the stevedore to perform in a workmanlike way, the shipowner to provide a safe place to work-they should
share the burden.
DirectLiability of Shipowner-employer to Longshoreman

Perhaps the most remarkable of the many extensions of the
Sieracki-Ryan doctrine is the Supreme Court's unqualified holding
that when a shipowner employs longshoremen directly, the exclusive-remedy clause does not bar a direct action by the longshoreman
against the shipowner for injuries due to unseaworthiness.
When this rule was first applied in Reed v. The Yaka, 45 it
seemed quite plausible to assume that the direct hiring of longshoremen was a deliberate device, employed by the very shipowner in144
145

332 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1964).
373 U.S. 410 (1963) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
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volved in Ryan, to circumvent the Ryan result. After all, if the
stevedore's increased costs are passed along to the shipowner in the
price of the stevedore's services, it is to the ultimate advantage of
the shipowner to block Sieracki-Ryan recoveries right from the start.
In any event, if there was ever any doubt that the Yaka rule was
one of general applicability, it was removed by Jackson v. Zykes
Steamship Co.1'6 The Court justified the result purely on the ground
that it was unfair to deny an unseaworthiness recovery to a longshoreman hired directly by a shipowner, while permitting the same
kind of recovery to a longshoreman doing exactly the same kind of
work when employed by an independent stevedore. The Court
said:
We cannot accept such a construction of the Act-an Act
designed to provide equal justice to every longshoreman similarly
situated. We cannot hold that Congress intended any14such
7
incongruous, absurd, and unjust result in passing this Act.
Of course, in passing this Act (the Longshoremen's Act) with
its exclusive-liability feature, Congress did not have the Ryan case
before it and could scarcely have formed any intentions about absurd
results that might follow from it. In fairness to Justice Black, one
may assume that this statement was merely a shorthand version of
what he had said in his Yaka opinion-that Congress had left Sieracki and Ryan unchanged. This seems to suggest that every time a
legislature leaves a court decision unchanged, all the implications of
that decision are retroactively imputed to the legislature as part of
legislative intent at the time of original enactment. This would be a
rather unrealistic rule of statutory construction-attributing to legislatures a degree of vigilance in scrutiny of judicial decisions, and
alacrity in passing legislation, that corresponds to nothing in the observed real world.
Be that as it may, Yaka is firmly lodged in the series, and the inevitable process of further extrapolation is well under way. In American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Weaver, 48 a direct suit by a longshoreman
against a shipowner under Yaka, the issue was whether the jury
should be instructed to disregard medical expenses and wage loss as
elements of damage, inasmuch ds these had already been paid by the
It is interesting
146 386 U.S. 731 (1967) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
to note that the opinions in both Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), and
Jackson were written by Justice Black, who also wrote the vigorous dissent in Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic $.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
147 386 U.S. at 735.
148 408 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1969).
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defendant under the Longshoremen's Act. It was held that instructions as to the full damages should be given to the jury. Two reasons
were presented: (1) to do otherwise would only confuse the jury,
and (2) under the three-way type of litigation involving an independent stevedore, full damages would be recoverable from the shipowner; since the object of Yaka was to achieve parity of treatment,
the instructions were required. The court admits that this way of
handling the matter presents the plaintiff's case "in a warmer light
to the jury." There would be no double recovery, of course, since
the employer would be reimbursed for his compensation expenditures.
The holding does, however, highlight how far this line of cases has
strayed from the exclusiveness of liability principle, when the employer is not only sued by his employee, but denied an offset for
the compensation he has in fact paid.
The net result is that the Supreme Court has now created, in
effect, a new kind of workmen's compensation act for longshoremen
-with strict liability drawn from the unseaworthiness doctrine, but
with unlimited benefits. It has achieved this by a series of gradual
extensions, each time looking back and saying it would be quite unfair to discriminate between the recipients of the last extension and
the proposed beneficiaries of the next extension. The widening range
of items embraced by the concept of an unseaworthy ship-to assaults,' 4 9 for example, and to conditions on dry land' 50 is an illustration of the same process. The Court has thus achieved for longshoremen a compensation system roughly resembling in result the
one it achieved for railroad workers by a series of judicial decisions;' 5 ' both classes of workers in a large proportion of cases have
the best of both worlds: strict liability and unlimited damages.
If the court believes that it is bound to do this by reasons of
humanitarian policy, that is understandable. But it really should not
announce that it is bound to do it in order to carry out the intention
of Congress. Congress expressed its intention as to the kind of
compensation act longshoremen should have when it passed the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act; Congress
149 See note 143 supra.
150 See, e.g., Thompson v. Calmar S.S.

Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964).
(Hastie & Smith, JI., dissenting).
151 See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 91.77 (Supp.
1969). The result in the case of railroad workers came about from the opposite
direction; that is, the court began with an employer's liability act based on fault but
with unlimited damage and gradually turned it into essentially a nonfault system by
insisting that practically every case go to the jury.
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decreed that this liability should be exclusive. As for discrimination
between workers injured by perils associated with the sea, the answer is that Congress intended to discriminate when it established
one kind of remedy for seamen in the Jones Act and a quite different
kind of remedy for longshoremen in the Longshoremen's and Harbor

Workers' Compensation Act.
Third Party'sIndemnity Action Under State Law

When we turn to cases arising under state law, we find a sharp
divergence of opinion. Some jurisdictions hold that when the relation between the parties is based on contract, an obligation of care
with an accompanying indemnity obligation can be implied and that
these obligations survive the exclusiveness defense; 152 others reject the
152 California: San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance, 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958). Plaintiff had contracted with
defendant to wash the windows of plaintiff's school buildings. The contract required defendants to furnish equipment and, for certain windows, stepladders were
to be used. A washer employed by defendant, operating in violation of this provision, was injured. He sued and recovered from plaintiffs on the theory of failure to
provide a safe working place. Plaintiffs brought action against defendant employer to recover the amount of that judgment and expenses incurred in the suit.
Plaintiff recovered on the ground that the contract held defendant responsible
for payment of any and all damages resulting from its operation. The court said
that if such a provision was not an express indemnity, it was an implied one. Accord, Vegetable Oil Prods. Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 252, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 555 (1963). Cross complaint against employer was permitted on an implied
agreement to indemnify the third party, although the statute of limitations for an
independent action had expired. Iowa: Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc.,
254 Iowa 856, 118 N.W.2d 559 (1962). An employee of a commercial cleaning
company was injured while cleaning a machine in the pork company plant. He
sued the pork company as a third party tortfeasor. The pork company crosspetitioned his employer, the cleaning company, for indemnity if held liable to the
employee. The court followed the reasoning of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. PanAtlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), that the employer could be held
liable to the third party tortfeasor on an implied promise to indemnify for breach
of contract. The Iowa court dealt with the exclusive-remedy defense on the theory
that the employer would not be liable to the third party for the employee's injuries, but for the employer's breach of contract with the third party. See also
American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950), decided under
the Iowa Act, and discussed in the Blackford opinion. Kentucky: Whittenberg
Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. App. 1965),
discussed in text accompanying note 161 infra. Missouri: McDonnell Aircraft
Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959). The
employee of a contractor hired to paint the third party's plant was injured by high
tension wires and sued to recover from the third party. The third party brought
in the contractor on the ground that the contractor had breached its duty of performance since it had been warned of the open wires. The court concluded that
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implied indemnity doctrine.1 53
The greater part of the controversy between these cases has
been supplied not by the issue whether an independent duty to indemnify based on contract is free of the compensation exclusiveness principle, but rather by the issue whether under the law of the
jurisdiction there is an implied obligation of care and indemnity in
the circumstances. 54 Because Ryan and related maritime cases have
the facts would support an implied contractual warranty not barred by the Missouri
Compensation Act. New York. Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County
Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938). See also Burris v.
American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941) (applying New York law and
following Westchester).
153 Alabama: See Central Stikstof Verkoopkanter, N.V. v. Walsh Stevedoring
Co., 380 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1967), holding that the implied warranty in Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), is a product of
admiralty law and should not be extended to a case controlled by Alabama law.
The court also holds that the existence of an express warranty precludes the existence of an implied warranty. Florida: Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967). Georgia: Central of Ga. Ry.
v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 165 S.E.2d 587 (1968). See also O'Steen v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 294 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (applying Georgia law and
quoted extensively in Lester). Louisiana: General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel
Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Louisiana law). See note 65 supra.
See also Taylor v. Fishing Tools, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. La. 1967) (applying
Louisiana law and refusing to extend the Ryan principle to cover the relation of a
repair contractor to a drilling platform owner). Maryland: American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584, 187 A.2d 864 (1963).
New Jersey: Bertone v. Turco Prods., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (applying
New Jersey law and finding no possibility of an implied agreement to indemnify
arising out of the sale of a solvent). New Mexico: Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern
Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960). The petroleum company hired Clower to drill a well and employed the B.J. Service Company to cement
the casing. Two Service employees were killed in a fire, and their dependents
brought a third-party action against Petroleum and Clower. Service's compensation
carrier intervened for its subrogation rights for benefits paid. Petroleum impleaded
Service, the employer, alleging that the fire was caused by the negligence of Service,
that the negligence was a breach of the contract between Petroleum and Service,
and that Service was liable under an implied agreement to indemnify Petroleum.
Petroleum received a release from the dependents. The trial court dismissed Petroleum's claim against Service, the employer, but granted Service's compensation
carrier a summary judgment against Petroleum. Tennessee: Trammell v. Appalachian Elec. Coop., 135 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) (holding that under
Tennessee law no indemnity was permitted). But see General Elec. Co. v. Moretz,
270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959) (decided under the Tennessee act and allowing
indemnity on the strength of I.C.C. regulations incorporated into the contract).
I
See note 70 supra.
154 This controversy ranges far beyond the class of cases originating in the
necessity of getting around the exclusiveness rule in workmen's compensation.
See,
e.g., Penn Tanker Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1969). Penn had
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bulked so large in this area, courts have all too often approached the
issue as if it were a matter of taking sides for or against Ryan; some
will then emphasize the peculiarities of the stevedore-shipowner situation and conclude that apart from such peculiarities Ryan should
not be emulated.
As we have seen, however, the doctrine here involved had its
genesis not in Ryan, but in the New York case of Westchester,
and has substantial support in nonstevedore, nonmaritime, and
nonfederal-law cases. The limiting factor is not the maritime quality,
but rather the underlying contractual quality of the relation. The
key to the Westchester type of case is that some kind of service was
performed for the indemnitee under contract, along with which an
implied obligation could run to the indemnitee to perform with due
care and to indemnify for damages flowing from breach of this obligation.
Probably the most troublesome point of difference is between
those cases that permit indemnity when the indemnitee's fault is relatively minor and those that flatly rule out indemnity if the indemnitee is guilty of any fault at all. The issue is well illustrated by the
Florida opinion in the Florida Power and Light Co. case. 155 The
court quotes the following statement from the Supreme Court's Italia
opinion:
Where the shipowner is liable to the employees of the stevedore company. . . for failing to supply a vessel and equipment
free of defects, regardlessof negligence, we do not think it unfair
or unwise to require the stevedore to indemnify the shipowner
for damages sustained as a result of injury-producing equipment
supplied156by the stevedore in furtherance of its contractual obligations.
The district court says that this is the "underlying basis for the Ryan
doctrine."
If by this the court means, as its italics indicate, that the essence
of the Ryan doctrine is that the indemnitee in a Ryan recovery must
be free from negligence, the statement is demonstrably wrong.
Weyerhaeuser I1 had already established beyond all doubt that a shippaid Jones Act damages to a seaman for an eye injury. A United States hospital
aggravated the injury by treatment. The court held that Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), could not be stretched to imply a duty
of workmanlike performance running from the hospital to Penn on the strength of
which a claim for indemnity would lie.
155 275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
156 376 U.S. 315, 324 (1964) (as quoted in 275 F. Supp. at 430).
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owner could be guilty of some negligence and still recover under
Ryan; the question from that point on became, as we have seen:
how much negligence? Nevertheless, the court goes on:
It therefore appears that if the Ryan doctrine is extended, it
would be extended only in favor of an indemnitee who has been
held liable without fault, based on some concept of strict liability
such as unseaworthiness. However, here as in the Ocean Drilling
case, the plaintiff's liability to Rita Aheam could not have been
based on liability without fault. On the contrary, as plaintiff
points out, its liability was based on its own negligence, even
'157
though it chooses to characterize that negligence as "passive.
What is really at stake here is a distinction between two indemnitees who have become liable-one without fault in any real
sense; the other, liable on the basis of a degree of fault that is relatively markedly less than that of the indemnitor. Practically all authorities, including texts and Restatements, would agree that if the
indemnitee has become liable on purely technical or vicarious
grounds, his constructive "fault" should not bar his right of indemnity
against one who has saddled him with liability through genuinely tortious conduct.J 58 This would include an indemnitee made liable, for
example, solely by an automobile owner's liability statute, 15 9 or by
a nondelegable duty with respect to the condition of premises. 06
Difficulty arises when the fault of the indemnitee moves from
"constructive" or "technical" to "passive" or "secondary." It is submitted that much of the difficulty can be avoided by eschewing the
use of vague adjectival descriptions like "passive," and sticking to
the familiar factual interplay between creation of a danger and failure
to discover it. It is difficult to see why there should be any conceptual obstacle to saying that when the employer negligently creates a
dangerous condition in performing a service for the third party, he
should indemnify the latter even if the third party was negligent to
the extent of failing to discover the danger. It must always be
borne in mind that we are here talking about a contractual relation. This helps to expose that sharp difference between the two
forms of default. It is relatively easy to say that one contracting to
perform services agrees not to create dangerous conditions. It is
much harder to say that one accepting and paying for such services
275 F. Supp. at 430.
See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 46 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
RESTITrrON §§ 76 & 95 (1937).
159 See text accompanying note 48 et seq. supra.
10 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 95, comment a at 289 (1937).
'57
158
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agrees that he will discover any dangerous conditions created by the
contractor.
An interesting variant on the Westchester-Ryan theme occurs
when the role of employer claiming immunity is played by a general
contractor, while the role customarily thought of as played by a third

party is occupied by the workman's immediate employer, a subcontractor. This variant is well illustrated by Whittenberg Engineering
& Construction Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 6 ' Defendant
Whittenberg, the general contractor, provided a defective hoist. An

employee of Knight, the subcontractor, was injured as a result. Plaintiff, Liberty Mutual, insured the subcontractor's compensation liability. Having paid this compensation, plaintiff sought indemnity
from the general contractor in the amount of the compensation paid.
It was held that defendant Whittenberg, the general contractor, was
liable to plaintiff for indemnity.

The decision is based squarely on a controlling precedent which
the court declined to overrule: Ruby Lumber Co. v. K. V. Johnson
Co., 6 2 as well as on Johnson v. Ruby Lumber Co.168 The rationale

is as follows: an implied contract of indemnity arises in favor of a
person who, without any fault on his part, is compelled to pay damages
on account of the negligence or tortious act of another; although the
general contractor as statutory employer is not a "third party" subject
to suit by virtue of the third-party action provisions of the compensa-

tion act, this is immaterial; the present suit is bottomed not on the
third-party section of the act but on the common-law right of indemnity.' 64
161 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. App. 1965).

299 Ky. 811, 187 S.W.2d 449 (1945).
278 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. App. 1954).
104 The court analyzes the two foreign cases holding to the contrary. The
first, Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199 A. 93
(1938), is criticized by the court for failure to distinguish adequately the principles
of contribution and indemnity. The A.L.R. commentator makes the same criticism
in the annotation at 117 A.L.R. 565 (1938). The second, New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Boaz-Kiel Constr. Co., 115 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1940), is rejected on the
ground that it considered common law rights "swept away" by the compensation
acts-a view which, in too general a form, the court points out has been criticized
by the author. See 2 A. LARSON, Tim LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 72.64 (Supp. 1969). The Kentucky cases on this point appear to stand alone,
except perhaps for the Illinois cases of Baker & Conrad v. Chicago Hts. Constr. Co.,
364 Ill. 386, 4 N.E.2d 953 (1936), and Thornton v. Herman, 380 Ill. 341, 43
N.E.2d 934 (1942), which are not entirely comparable since they arose under the
peculiar former provisions of the Illinois statute abrogating the common law right of
the employee against a third-party tortfeasor, but continuing it in the hands of
the employer.
162
163
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This distinction is dramatically illustrated by this case. Earlier
an attempt had been made by the employee to sue the general contractor as third-party tortfeasor and the present plaintiff insurer had
joined in that action as subrogee; that action was dismissed. The
court here, therefore, had the additional question of res adjudicata.
It disposed of it principally by observing that the statute-based right
of subrogation and the common-law-based right of indemnity were
different causes of action. Likewise collateral estoppel did not apply, since the substantive issue of negligence was never actually litigated and determined.
The practical effect of the Kentucky rule is not quite so startling
as might first appear; the liability being thrown upon the general contractor is not a large common-law damage liability. It is limited to
the workmen's compensation liability of the subcontractor or his insurer. The net result is that when the general contractor's negligence
is solely responsible for the injury, he becomes ultimately liable for
workmen's compensation, whether or not the subcontractor is insured. If the subcontractor is not insured, this would happen by the
operation of the statutory-employer provision; if the subcontractor is
insured, it would happen by the route of the present type of indemnity suit by the subcontractor's insurer.
NoncontractualIndemnity
Up to this point, the genesis of the relation between employer
and third party has been either a contract or a special relationship,
such as that of bailee to bailor, that carries with it an established set
of legal rights and duties. The final combination to be examined
is that in which there is no such contractual or special relation-the
simplest illustration being that of a collision between strangers. If
the form of the recovery over by the third party against the employer sounds in tort, as in a claim for contribution, the near-universal rule, as noted earlier, 165 bars the action under the exclusive-remedy
principle. There remains the question of whether by clothing his
claim in the form of indemnity, the third party can surmount the
exclusiveness barrier.
The third-party plaintiff here has not one hurdle to leap, but
two. He must first establish that the law implies an agreement by
the primary tortfeasor to indemnify the secondary. Even if he can do
this, however, the harder task remains: he must also show that this
165 See text accompanying note 5 et seq. supra.
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liability, even if contractual in form, is not on account of the injury.
The final result of this dual obstacle is clear: the great majority
of cases hold that when the relation between the parties does not
spring from a contract or special position such as bailee or lessee,
the third party cannot recover indemnity from the employer. This
results because an active or primary wrongdoer does not have an
implied obligation, capable of penetrating the exclusiveness rule of

workmen's compensation law, to indemnify a passive or secondary
wrongdoer. 166 In the leading case establishing this rule, Judge
Learned Hand gave the following reason for the holding:
[W]e shall assume that, when the indemnitor and indemnitee are
both liable to the injured person, it is the law of New Jersey that,
166 Federal: United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), held that as to government employees
killed in a collision between a United Air Lines plane and a military plane, United
was barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (which are indistinguishable from those of the Longshoremen's
Act) from recovery over against the United States in the absence of an express or
implied duty of indemnity based on a contractual relation or a joint liability to the
injured party. The former condition was unsatisfied since there was no contract
between the parties, and the court refused to find an implied indemnity growing out
of a concept of active and passive or primary and secondary negligence. The latter
condition was also unsatisfied because there was nothing here resembling the special admiralty duty of sharing damages invoked in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963) (Weyerhaeuser 1) rev'g United States v. Weyerhaeuser
S.S. Co., 294 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1961). This aspect of the case is discussed in
the text accompanying note 15 supra. Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302
F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1962), discussed in note 65 supra:
Furthermore, even if we were to agree with Halliburton that its fault was only
passive or secondary, there is a serious doubt that this alone would be a sufficient ground for imposing an obligation to indemnify upon Norton, in view of
the fact that the applicable workmen's compensation statutes have completely
abolished an employer's tort liability for injuries to his employees.
Id. at 434. See also Brown v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16
(3d Cir. 1954); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir.
1953); Lo Bue v. United States, 188 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1951); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950), discussed in note 98
supra; Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Terminals
Corp., 65 A.2d 304 (Md. 1949) (applying Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act). See also Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1367 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), for an inconclusive discussion of noncontract indemnity. Georgia:
Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 165 S.E.2d 587 (1968). The
court quotes most of the opinion from O'Steen. See O'Steen v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 294 F. Supp. 409 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (applying Georgia law). Louisiana: General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir 1968) (applying
Louisiana law). See treatment of this case in note 65 supra. See also Halliburton
v. Norton Drilling Co., supra, in this note under Federal, in which the court says
that although maritime law controlled, it would reach the same result applying
Louisiana law; Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv.,
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regardless of any other relation between them, the difference in
377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967), applying Louisiana law
and holding that there can be no noncontractual indemnity even when the third
party's negligence was "passive." Michigan: Husted v. Consumers Power Co.,
376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W.2d 370 (1965). Plaintiff employee sued third-party
Power Company for alleged negligence as to its power line. Power Company
sought reimbursement from plaintiffs employer, alleging negligence in bringing a
crane in contact with the power line-the episode that injured plaintiff. The court
held that the action by the Power Company over against the employer would not lie.
The right to implied indemnity was not established. The court flatly rejected the
active-passive negligence theory. Instead, it follows the Slattery case, supra this
note under Federal, and the often-cited common law rule that the right of indemnity arises against a wrongdoer whose wrong has saddled the plaintiff with a liability
only when the plaintiff's own wrong does not bar him. The court also emphatically
rules out contribution as a ground for recovery over. New Jersey: Bertone v. Turco
Prod., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (applying New Jersey law); Slattery v.
Marry Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951) (applying New Jersey law); North
Carolina: Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d
768 (1953); North Dakota: White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., 225 F. Supp. 940
(D.N.D. 1964); Texas: Abilene v. Jones, 355 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
The third-party tortfeasor, held liable to the employee for damages as the result of a
collision, could not recover contribution or indemnity from the injured worker's employer on pleading that the contractor employer had furnished the worker a defective
tractor and that the employer had been negligent in entrusting the use of the
tractor to an unsafe and incompetent operator, the injured worker. The employer
secured summary judgment. Cf. Westfall v. Lorenzo Gin Co., 287 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956), which implies that an indemnity action might lie if the third
party pleaded facts showing that the employer was guilty of gross negligence. No
case is cited in which such a recovery over has in fact been allowed. Wisconsin:
Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, 16 Wis. 2d 145, 113 N.W.2d 562 (1962).
Meissner and Associated Sales & Bag Company (manufacturer) sold certain industrial aprons to Kennedy-Ingalls Corporation (supplier) who in turn sold the aprons
to A.O. Smith Corporation (employer), one of whose employees was severely burned
when the apron caught fire. The result of a number of claims and actions stood
as follows: The employee received $17,000 in compensation benefits from the
employer. The employee also received an additional $17,000 in damages from the
supplier. The supplier was in turn reimbursed in an action on warranty of goods
by the manufacturer. The employer sought to be reimbursed directly from the
manufacturer for the $17,000 compensation paid to the employee. The manufacturer
counterclaimed to recover the amount paid to the supplier on the grounds that the
employer had been negligent in allowing the employee to use the apron. The court
held that the employer could not be liable in tort to the manufacturer for any
damages the manufacturer had had to pay the supplier since the employer's exclusive
liability for the employee's injuries lay under the compensation act and therefore
the employer could not be liable in tort for the same loss as a joint tortfeasor or as
one contributorily negligent. The counterclaim was dismissed. Contra: Kentucky:
Kentucky Util. Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop., 438 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.
App. 1968). Plaintiff settled a wrongful death claim in which it had been alleged
that plaintiff was negligent in failing to discover and correct a dangerous condition
which had been created by defendant, the decedent's employer. After settling the
death claim, plaintiff sought recovery against the employer for indemnification.
The workmen's compensation act was held not to bar recovery in this case, if the
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gravity of their faults may be great enough to throw the whole
loss upon one. We cannot, however, agree that that result is rationally possible except upon the assumption that both parties
are liable to the same person for the joint wrong. If so, when
one of the two is not so liable, the right of the other to indemnity
arising out of some other
must be found in rights and liabilities
167
legal transaction between the two.
Note that as to the two hurdles, Judge Hand does not concern himself
with the first. He assumes for the sake of argument that the thirdparty plaintiff could overcome it in New Jersey, since in any case
the second hurdle, the exclusiveness bar, is insurmountable. In some
of the cases, the first issue-whether there is any implied obligation
of indemnity at all-is treated at more length. The results vary, but
the final outcome is usually the same: the action fails. For this
reason, there is little occasion for an extended discussion of the extent to which different states accept the fiction of an implied agreea lesser wrongdoer when the
ment by one wrongdoer to reimburse
68
latter is forced to pay the damagesY.
In General Electric Co. v. Cuban American Nickel Co., 6 9 for
example, Judge Wisdom examines with great thoroughness the state
of the Louisiana law on this point and concludes that in that jurisdiction the distinction is between, not active and passive negligence,
but actual and constructive fault. In either case, however, the action would be barred, since its origin lies in the breach of a duty owed
by the employer to the employee. In other words, the same kind of
"common liability," which is a condition precedent to recovery of
contribution by one tortfeasor against another, is also a condition
precedent to recovery of indemnity by a secondary from a primary
wrongdoer. 7 0 In these cases there can be no such common liaemployer's negligence was primary and the plaintiff's negligence secondary.

There

was apparently no contractual relation between the plaintiff and defendant. They
were two utility companies, one of which had negligently allowed a transmission

line to come too close to a line of the other company. The court relied on Whittenberg Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. App.
1965), and Johnson v. Ruby Lumber Co., 278 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. App. 1954), but does

not go into the possibility of a distinction between cases such as those involving a
contract between the parties and cases like the present one, involving no contract
or legal relation between the parties.
167 Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951).
168 For a discussion of this fiction, see F. WooDwARD, Tim LAw OF QUASI
CoNTRAcTs § 259 (1913). The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
when one person's guilt consists in creating a dangerous condition and the other's
consists only in failing to discover it, the former's negligence is primary and subjects him to this indemnity obligation. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 222 (1905).
169 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968).
170 Indeed, this class of cases is not so much different from the ordinary con-
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bility, because the employer's liability to the employee, which is a
special and exclusive liability under the compensation act, cannot be
a liability in common with the third party's liability.
The attempt to assert noncontractual indemnity often occurs
in cases in which the relation between the employer and the third
party is indeed contractual at base. Here its role is that of a "second
string to the bow" of the third-party plaintiff. In such cases, however,
it has never added anything to the third party's case. If he has failed
to establish a Ryan-type indemnity running with the contract, it is
not surprising that he has fared no better in trying to extract a noncontractual indemnity from the same facts. On the other hand, in
one or two cases courts have begun by finding that the facts in the
case would support a common-law right of indemnity on the activepassive negligence theory, but then, finding that route blocked by
the exclusive-remedy clause, have gone on to say that the same
facts would also support an implied contractual warranty of the
Ryan-Westchester type not barred by the act.' 7 If the Kittleson
case' 7 2 were to be decided today, it would probably follow this pattern since, as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in Slattery v.
Marra Brothers,17 8 it could be explained on the basis of the employer's undertaking to the contractor to furnish the contractor's
men with a safe place to work.
In some cases, however, there is no contract whatever between
the parties. Thus, in United Air Lines1 4 there was simply an air
collision; in Abilene v. Jones,'7 5 an automobile-tractor collision; in
Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 1 6 a contact between the employee's
crane and the third party electric company's power line. In other
tribution cases as might at first appear. The fiction of implied promise can be
applied just as readily to ordinary contribution between tortfeasors as to indemnity
between primary and secondary tortfeasors and has indeed been used in some jurisdictions as the theoretical justification for contribution. While this theory is unnecessary to account for contribution, Camp v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio St. 337, 5 Am. Rep.
669 (1870), it would, in jurisdictions where it is accepted, support an argument that
contribution can be demanded of the employer by the third party with just as much
reason as indemnity if both are based on the fiction of a separate obligation running
from the employer to the third party.
'71

American President Lines, Ltd. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 234 F.2d 753

(9th Cir. 1956); McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co.,
323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
172

179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950), rev'g 81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Iowa 1948).

178

186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951).

174
175
176

335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
355 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W.2d 370 (1965).
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cases there may be a contractual relation of sorts, but not one along
which an implied obligation can travel, or at least not travel in the
necessary direction. In Bertone v. Turco Products,Inc., 177 the third
party was the manufacturer and the employer was the purchaser
of a dangerous solvent. If the positions had been reversed, a separate
implied duty running with the goods might have been found, although in the Cuban American Nickel case even this was not
enough.178 When a purchaser buys a product, however, does he
make an implied contract with the manufacturer to use the goods in
such a way as not to bring liability upon the manufacturer? This
would be stretching the concept of contract out of all relation to
reality. The court's approach to the matter assumed that the employer's duty to the manufacturer, if any, would have to be one based
on its relative negligence, and on that basis could not survive the exclusive-liability clause. A similar attempt to make a manufacturer's
warranty relationship operate in reverse was thwarted in KennedyIngalls Corp. v. Meissner.1 9 Here the manufacturer of an apron,
bought by the employer from a supplier, was ultimately held liable
for injuries to the employee when the apron caught fire. The manufacturer attempted to recover over against the employer on the ground
that the employer was negligent in letting the employee use the apron.
The action was held barred, since the employer could not be found
jointly liable with the manufacturer in tort.
In summary, when the relation between the parties involves no
contract or special relation capable of carrying with it an implied obligation to indemnify, the basic exclusiveness rule generally cannot
be defeated by dressing the remedy itself in contractual clothes, such
as indemnity. What governs in these cases is not the delictual or
contractual form of the remedy but the question: is the claim "on
account of" the injury, or on account of a separate obligation running from the employer to the third party?
CONCLUSION

The phrase most frequently heard in arguments against recovery
over by the third party against the employer is this: the allowance
of such recovery over accomplishes indirectly what cannot be done
directly and, therefore, evades the spirit of the legislation. This is
not entirely accurate, for it does not tell the whole story. True, the
17

178
179

252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958).
See notes 65 & 169 supra.
16 Wis. 2d 145, 113 N.W.2d 562 (1962).
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end result is that a common-law size recovery proceeds from the employer to the employee. In the process, however, two things are accomplished, one of which is relevant to the purposes of the compensation provision and the other of which is independent of it. The
relevant accomplishment is that of preserving the employee's commonlaw rights against negligent outsiders. This having been done, there
still remains the job of adjusting rights fairly between the outsider
and the negligent employer. The question here becomes very precise: did the compensation acts, in conferring immunity on the employer from common-law suits, mean to do so only at the expense
of the injured employee, or also at the expense of outsiders? One answer is that whereas the injured employee got quid pro quo in receiving assured compensation payments as a substitute for tort recoveries, the third party has received absolutely nothing and, hence,
should not be impliedly held to have given up rights which he had before. It is unfair, so the argument runs, to pull the third party within
the principle of mutual sacrifice when his part is to be all sacrifice
and no corresponding gain.
A situation like this ought to be dealt with legislatively. It is
rather inconsiderate to force courts to speculate about legislative intention on the strength of statutory language, in the framing of
which the draftsmen had not the remotest trace of the present question
in their minds. The legislature should face squarely the question
whether the third party who happens to be so unfortunate as to get
tangled up with a compensable injury should, so to speak, individually subsidize the compensation system by bearing alone a burden which normally he could shift to the employer.

